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"Instead of trying to ruin German trade by all kinds of
additional trade barriers and hindrances as was the mood of 1917,
we have definitely adopted the view that it is not in the interests
of the world and our two countries (Great Britain and the United
States) that any large nation should be unprosperous or shut out
from the means of making a decent living for itself and its people
by its industry and enterprise."
"Winston Churchill, August, 1941
Digitized by the Internet Archive
in 2016 with funding from
Boston Library Consortium Member Libraries
https://archive.org/details/wargermaneconomyOOgree
CHAPTER I
GERMANY’S ECONOMIC PROGRESS AND EXPANSION - 1848-1914
A. The German Peasantry .
The German peasant was typical of those residing in other countries
during the period 1848-1870, He was a hard working, uneducated fellow
who labored from dawn to dark for little remuneration. He raised a
large family in order to help with the farm chores and his agricultural
methods differed little from those of his predecessor a century before.
"A traveler moving .into Germany up the Rhine from Holland would
observe scattered homesteads, few compact villages and a slightly im-
proved agriculture over that of other parts of Europe. Even during this
period the German had an intensive desire for order and precision which
was reflected by his neat little plot, well cultivated and rotated, with
every available inch of ground utilized for some useful purpose." (1)
These simple folk lived in a feudal state tinder Hardenburg’s Edict
©f 1816 which remained in force until 1850. The highest class of
peasants, other than the aristocracy of freeholders which the Edict did
not touch, were those whose lands were regarded as heritable, who in
England would have been termed copyholders of inheritance. These were
to become full proprietors on ceding to their lord a third of their land
as compensation for what the lord sacrificed. Those whose property had
not been hitherto heritable, and they were in a great majority, were to
cede one half. If a man had so small a holding that he could not live
on the remnant, he might keep all his land and pay rent.
Some relief was afforded by regulations adopted from time to
time for the peasants whose lands were heritable. They bought off
(1) Clapham, J. H., "Economic Development of France and Germany",
University Press, Cambridge, 1921, P. 30.
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2their old obligations by a sacrifice of land, or by an agreement to pay
rent without sacrificing land, and there were no great delays in improv-
ing their status.
However, the tenants on non-heritable lands fared badly in the long
run. They became involved in debt and in order to stay out of prison
obligated themselves to the landlords, pledging their property for
emergency financial assistance. The peasants falling into this category
soon became aware of their serf-like status and observed that their
land and themselves were their lords' property. Thus did the more energetic
and aggressive quit the farms and swell the populations of the cities
which increased the labor supply available for industrial growth and
expansion.
1. German Peasants in Eastern Germany.
’’The further a traveler went into eastern Germany the more
clear it became that he was in a land conquered by Germans from Slavs." (1)
Within fifty miles of the Elbe he found islands of Slavonic
speech. In Posen and West Prussia he crossed broad stretches of
Polish territory recently taken over by Prussia, to pass into East
Prussia, a country conquered centuries earlier, yet with a rural
population, predominantly Slavonic in blood and largely Slavonic in
speech. If the traveler turned south into eastern and southern
Silesia he came into a land of Slavonic dialect. The above-description
would seem to indicate that the residents of Eastern Germany at present
have a strong strain of Slav despite the contentions of Adolph Hitler
(1) Clapham, J. H., "Economic Development of France and Germany",
University Press, Cambridge, 1921, P. 30.
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and the National Socialist dootrine.
2. German Peasants in Western Germany.
The West on the other hand was land of small productive
farms and few towns of any size. The inhabitant of this part of
Germany was a stolid, plodding fellow of strictly Teutonic background
and ideologies. The division of his land and the methods used in
cultivating it were truly representative of British and French
influence. The Englishman would indeed feel at home in Western Germany
as he observed the neat little farms surrounded by hedges. The French-
man would likewise note the familiar site of small villages so closely
resembling those of his own land.
"The British and French influence was indeed obvious in
Western Germany although the residents were somewhat different in
temperament and in many cases more skilled agriculturalists.” (1)
3. Emancipation.
The most conspicious emancipation movement was that in
Prussia, and as Prussia after 1815 was the sole state representative
of almost all Germany, with lands stretching from the servile Slavonic
east to the free Dutch west, the Prussian movement deserves mention
here.
Most stories regarding Prussia begin with Frederick the
Great and this will prove to be no exception. An owner of nearly one-
third of his kingdom, Frederick had an ample field for his emancipa-
tion experiment. On his own manors he defined and lightened peasants
(1) Clapham, J. H., "Economic Development of France and Germany",
University Press, Cambridge, 1921, P. 32,
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4services, secured for them the right of inheritance, and began an
attack on the legal doctrine which placed some of them in a state of
bodily servitude. He also attacked the technical side of Agrarian
Reform by dividing up commons and rearranging fields, so as to allow
for more individual agriculture. After Frederick’s death, Prussia returned
to its old ways for a black period of thirty years. However, at the
expiration of this period teachings and practices of Frederick reinforced
by the new doctrine of Anglo-French economic freedom became apparent,
and the shackles and barriers which had hitherto sheltered the peasant
were broken down. This led to a mass migration from the farms to the
towns which soon became cities, in these newly created cities, infant
industries were conceived which were later to create Germany of the
future, the most highly industrialized nation on the Continent.
B. The Rise of the German Empire .
It is a common belief that Germany owed her rapid ascent to the
position of number one industrial power in continental Europe to the
founding of the Empire in 1871. On the whole this is true, but it
would be a misconception to believe that before the Empire was founded,
Germany had been a poor agricultural country far behind the countries
of western Europe in industrial development. It is true that
before 1870 the center of industrialization in Europe was west of
the Rhine, and that only from there, primarily from England, did
Germany derive the stimuli for her own industrialization. But when
Bismarck forged the Reich with "blood and iron", "coal and iron"
were already busy building up the economic foundations for this
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new great power. (1)
The chief advantage in industrialization a big nation enjoys over
a smaller one is that it has a larger area free of tariff barriers
and other trade impediments. Until the founding of the Reich the
Germany of today was politically divided into about thirty states, only
loosely connected. Before 1866 it was not even clear whether the
Austrian Monarchy, its whole territory-huge as compared with the various
German states, would remain inside the German bund and subsequently
became the nucleus for the recreation of a German Empire. But while
politically this paramount gueat was still to be decided by the sword,
economically the decision had been made more than a generation earlier.
The "smaller Germany solution", this is, the founding of the
German Empire tinder Prussian leadership, excluding Austria, was en-
forced by Prussia in the victories on the Bohemian (1866) and French
(1870-1) battlefields, but it has been perfected in the economic
sphere as early as 1833. In this year Prussia succeeded in uniting the
most important of the future German Federal States in the framework of
the German Zollverein. Other states joined rapidly, and after 1854
the Zollverein included all the territory that in 1871 was to be
included in the German Reich except Mecklenburg, Hamburg, Bremen, and
the territories annexed in the subsequent wars (Schleswig-Holstein and
Alsace-Lorraine)
•
(1) Keynes, J. W., "Economic Consequences of the Peace",
Harcourt, Brace, New York, 1920, P. 75,
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"The German Zollverein represented a complete customs union and
traffic among the member states and was not impeded by any kind of
tariff barriers. The only customs frontiers were those between the
member states and the world outside, to which, in this respect,
Austria belonged. However, this was as far as German unification
want at that time. There was neither a common currency, nor freedom
of movement and settlement in the several States. In spite of this
loosely knit plan of organization the Zollverein proved to be a potent
stimulant for economic development. The chief reasons advanced for
the economic flowering of Germany in the period before the found-
ing of the Reich were: (a) Agrarian reforms of the Napoleonic Era.
(b) Influences from the French domination over 'Western Germany.
(c) Influx of British capital and British enterprise." (1)
The United States also enters the picture at this time in that the
discovery of the California goldfields gave a most powerful stimulus
to the German States. It was a period of rapid development in rail-
road construction, banking and advancement of heavy industries.
However, on the eve of the founding of the Empire, Germany was
still what would appear to be an agricultural country. In 1871, of
a population of 41,000,000, sixty-four percent lived in the country
(communities with fewer than two thousand inhabitants). Measured by
the standards of that time, however, German industry was not exactly
standing still. Large amounts of coal and lignite were being mined
and the production of iron ore and pig iron was approximately one-
(1) Clapham, J. H., "Economic Development of France and Germany",
University Press, Cambridge, 1921, P. 30.
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sixth of that produced by Great Britain. To what a high level Germany
had advanced economically may be gauged from the fact that in 1870
the railroad system had a mileage of 18650 kilometers (11,501 miles).
The United States had 52,922 miles. (1)
1. Actual Founding of the Empire.
Yifhen Austria and the German States allied with her were
finally defeated in the short war of 1866, the North German States
had been united by Prussia to form the North German Federation under
Prussian leadership. Five years later, after another victorious
campaign, the Reich was founded in the heart of a conquered enemy
country, France. Thus the economic effects of unification and victory
over a prosperous country coincided and enchanced one another.
Not until the Reich was founded could trade regulations
for the whole territory be unified. Conditions for the exercise of
all trades that had hitherto been restricted were now regulated in the
spirit of liberalism, at that time predominant in Germany. Thus for
the first time (1871) complete freedom of movement for individuals
and merchandise inside the Reich’s territory was secured.
2. The German War Machine.
Since the time of Napoleon I, the art and science of war
has made enormous progress. A new era opened up with the advent of
the king of military strategists and scientists. Count Helmuth Karl
(l) Stolper, Gustav, "German Economy", Reynal and Hitchcock,
New York, 1940, P. 21.
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Bernhard von Moltke. Frederick the Great and Napoleon I used to make
elaborate preparations for war, but their work was clumsy and super-
ficial in comparision to the minute studies and detailed preparations
made by Moltke. (1) For example, Napoleon would concentrate the
fire of hundreds of guns on that point of the enemy 1 s position which
to him appeared to be of the greatest importance and batter it in.
Moltke, however, concentrated the best brains of his army on the one
point which to him was the critical one. Moltke* s chief aim was to
surprise the enemy by unparalleled celerity of the mobilization of
army, to fall upon him while he was still unprepared, and to smash
him before the attack was expected. To this end he reorganized the
Prussian General Staff, and made it the active brain of the Army.
Moltke* s plan of organization was the beginning of
skilled intelligence activity organized on a specialized plane. His
theories of positive intelligence and technical intelligence are
still considered to be the best ever developed. Odd as it may seem,
Moltke was also an amateur economist and gave great consideration to
the economic potentialities of the enemy and governed his activities
accordingly. Certain attacks wore made to knock out enemy territory
containing iron and coal deposits, and much of Moltke’ s economic
warfare, although crude, was the basis for strategy used in World
Yfar II.
The sole responsibility for the organization of the General
Staff which survived until ingloriously defeated in World War II belongs
(1) Barker, J. E., "Modern Germany", E. P. Dutton and Company,
New York, 1919, P. 65.
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to the Prussian Military Caste to wham soldiering v/as a career and
life’s work. Badly defeated in 1806, they were reorganized by
Moltke and functioned actively until 1919. Although not fighting on
the Continent all during this time they participated as professional
soldiers in about every conflict the world has experienced. Prussians
always dominated this staff and composed the majority of its
membership. The staff members, however, were not merely ornaments
who because of Junker tradition and prestige graced the rolls of the
army. They were rather brilliant soldiers of fortune whose whole life
was engulfed by the army and whose sole objective was to install Germany
as the number one world power. The surviving Prussian old guard
still remain the uncompromising and cold military men portrayed by
their forebearers.
Germany’s victory over France was less due to superior
strategy or to superior planning strangely enough, than to great superiority
in methodical preparatory organization. For example, it took France
three weeks to mobilize her army and only took the Germans eleven days.
Consequently the brilliant invasion plan of Napoleon III miscarried
for the well schooled and perfectly equipped German Army Corps fell
into their places with incredible speed and rapidly crossed the
frontier in overwhelming numbers long before the French were ready
or expected them. The General Staff from this time onward created a
school of independent military thinkers in Germany whose principles
of minute comprehensive inquiry and careful foresight were also
''
.
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applied to commerce and industry making Germany surprising success-
ful in the more peaceful arts.
3. Economic Policy.
The close of the Napoleonic Wars left Germany devastated,
impoverished, and exhausted with much of her industries and commerce
destroyed. While the whole Continent had been ravished and ruined by
incessant wars and hostile invasions, British industries had flourished
and prospered in internal peace. During the slow progress of recupera-
tion on the Continent, Great Britain conquered the commerce and
industries of the world. Towards the end of the nineteenth century.
Great Britain was the merchant, manufacturing carrier, banker and
engineer of the world. She ruled supreme in the realm of business.
Two-thirds of the world’s shipping flew the British flag, two-thirds
of the coal produced in the world was British, she had more miles of
railway than the whole Continent and produced more cotton goods and
more iron than all the countries of the world combined.
While Great Britain was the undisputed mistress of the
world's trade, industry, finance and shipping, Germany was a relatively
poor country in an international sense. She had been impoverished by
her constant wars. She had neither colonies, good coal, shipping, or
a rich soil and a climate favorable to agriculture. Communications were
bad in the interior and her internal trade still remained somewhat
obstructed and undeveloped. She possessed only one good harbor and
was burdened with a costly militarism. According to the forecast
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of British free traders, Germany was predestined to remain a poor
agricultural country, exactly as Great Britain was predestined to
remain a rich industrial nation.
About this time arose in Germany Friedrich List, a
writer on political economy and a convinced believer in protection.
He had travelled and seen the world, and had lived a long time in
England and the United States. Consequently he spoke with greater
practical knowledge on international affairs than the majority of
political economists.
At the time Friedrich List wrote that Great Britain was
wealthy and powerful, while Germany was poor and weak. List endeavored
to show how Great Britain had become wealthy and how Germany also
might acquire wealth, profiting from Great Britain’s example. After
investigating the economic history of England, he summed up the result
of his inquiry as follows:
"The English, by a system of restrictions, privileges
and encouragements, have succeeded in transplanting
on to their native soil the wealth, spirit and talents
of foreign enterprise.
"It is true that from the increase in her power and
in her productive capacity England is indebted not
solely to her commercial restrictions, to her pro-
tective laws, and to her commercial treaties, but in
a large measure also to her conquest in science and
in the arts.
"How comes it that in these days one million of Eng-
lish operatives can perform the work of hundreds of
millions? It comes from the great demand for manu-
factured goods which by her wise and energetic policy
England ha6 created in foreign lands, and especially
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in her colonies; from the wise and powerful pro-
tection extended to her home industries; from
the greatest rewards which by means of her patent
laws she has offered to every new discovery; and
from the extraordinary facility for inland trans-
port afforded by her public roads, canals and
railways
•
"England has for a long time monopolized the in-
ventive genius of every nation. It is no more than
fair that England, now that she has attained the
culminating point of her industrial growth and
progress, should restore again to the nations of
the continent a portion of those productive forces
which she originally derived from them."
From these facts List drew the logical conclusion and
applied it to Germany. He said:
"Modern Germany, lacking a system of vigorous and
united commercial policy, exposed her home markets
to competition from foreign manufacturing powers
in every way superior to herself. At the same
time Germany was excluded from foreign markets by
arbitrary and often capricious restrictions. It
is therefore necessary that Germany secure their
home markets for their own industries by the
adoption of a united vigorous system of commercial
policy.
"We venture to assert that on the development of
the German protective system depend the existence,
the independence, and the future of the German
nationality. Only in the soil of general prosperity
does the national spirit strike its roots and pro-
duce fine blossoms and rich fruits. Only from the
unity of material interests does unity of purpose
arise, and from both of these national power." (1)
Germany's progress under a system of protective tariffs
was steady, continuous and rapid. Between 1850 and 1900 Germany's pro-
duction of iron, her consumption of cotton, and her savings bank deposits
grew gigantically. In 1914 her population had about four times the
(1) Barker, J. E., "Modern Germany", E. P. Dutton and Company,
New York, 1919, P. 172.
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amount of savings in the savings banks which was to be found in the
British Savings Banks. Sixty years prior to 1900, according to
List, the average wages of British workmen were four times as much
as those of the average German workman. Before World War I German
wages and British wages were equally high in many instances. Hence,
German wages under protective tariffs had risen four fold in many
trades. From a poor debtor nation, Germany became a rich creditor
country. Formerly she had to borrow money in foreign countries and
on onerous terms. In 1914, German capital invested abroad amounted
probably to about eight billion dollars. (1)
A considerable proportion of the responsibility for
Germany’s sensational advance must also be borne by those who advocated
German unity at home and achieved their goal. The customs union had
prepared the way and the German nation derived immense additional
economic advantages from its newly gained unity. Not until the Reich
was founded could trade regulation for the whole country be unified.
Complete freedom of movement for individuals and merchandise inside
the Reich’s territory was achieved. Measures and weights, until then
varying widely in the different states were made uniform on the basis
of the metric system. However, like the United States, the German
Reich began as a federation of soverign states, and retained that
status until the revolution of 1918. But while, as far as domestic
and foreign politics were concerned, Germany became a unified state,
the financial and administrative power remained chiefly with the
(1) Barker, J. E., "Modern Germany", E. P. Dutton and Company,
New York, 1919, P. 174.
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individual states up to the time of the Weimar Constitution.
At the time of the founding of the Reich, Germany was
still divided into seven separate currency areas. Furthermore, there
were thirty-three banks of issue entirely unconnected with one another
and carrying on their issuing activities under completely different
rules and laws.
With such a chaotic currency system, any monetary policy
in an industrialized country would have been impossible. The one
feature common to all these currencies was that silver was the legal
tender except in Bremen where gold was used.
The unified currency of the new Reich, however, was based
on the gold standard. The adoption of the gold standard was of extraordinary
significance at a time when no great country besides Great Britian had
yet introduced it. But when Germany reached this momentous decision,
the great crisis of silver was already in the offing, and it was to be
expected that France and the United States would also soon conform to
the gold standard. By taking the lead the young German Reich rendered
a great service to world economy. It cleared a path to an inter-
national currency unification on the gold basis, which for the whole
period up to the World War proved of the greatest importance for the
rapid expansion of world trade. (1)
4. Industrial Growth.
Despite the intensification of agriculture, the rural
sector participated to only a negligible degree in the growth of the
(1) Stolper, Gustav, "German Economy", Reynal and Hitchcock,
New York, 1940, P. 32.
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population. As in other industrial countries, rural life lost its
attractions. A flight from the land began, with the result that the
natural increase in population was absorbed by the cities. This
shift in population enabled agriculture and industry to exchange
their relative importance in Germany's economic life.
The broad foundation for Germany' s industrial expansion
was created by the development of her heavy industries. In coal mining
Germany never caught up with her rival. Great Britain but even so,
German coal mining expanded at a rate with which only that of the
United States is comparable. Hard coal production rose from an
annual average of 34,500,000 tons in the period 1871-5 to 191,500,000
in 1913. The rich bituminous mines were increasingly developed, and
the production of bituminous coal increased from 9,700,000 tons to
87.500.000 tons in the same period. (1)
The German iron industry owed its expansion as much to
its coal basis as to the ore mines of Lorraine. German iron-ore pro-
duction increased from an annual average of 5,300,000 tons in the period
1871-5 to 28,700,000 tons in 1913. This provided the foundation for
the growth of the iron industry. In 1871, German pig iron production
was 1,564,000 tons, in 1910 14,794,000 tons. As late as 1900, British
pig iron production (9,103,000 tons) exceeded German production
(8,521,000 tons) but in steel Germany (7,372,000 tons) already beat
her British rival (5,981,000 tons). In 1910, German iron production
was far ahead of all other European countries ; Great Britain with
10.172.000 tons of pig iron and 7,613,000 tons of crude steel had been
(1) Stolper, Gustave, ’’German Economy”, Reynal and Hitchcock,
Hew York, 1940, P. 41.
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left far behind. (1)
Germany made use of her heavy industries (a) to build
up her railroad system (her railroad mileage increaded from 18,560
kilometers in 1870 to 60,521 kilometers in 1912); (b) to create one of
the mightiest merchant fleets in the world (her mercantile steamer fleet
increased from 147 ships with 81,994 gross register tons in 1871 to
2,098 ships with 4,380,348 gross register tons in 1913); (c) to expand
her machine industry at a gigantic pace into one of the largest sources
of exports (51,000 were employed in 1861, 356,000 in 1882, and
1,120,000 in 1907). Finally, the position taken by the armament
industries should not be overlooked, in 1912 the firm of Krupp of
Essen employed 68,300 workers.
Most economists prior to World War I did not believe it
v/as possible for a European state to possess flourishing manufacturing,
and prosperous rural industries at the same time. Yet Germany possessed
both highly developed manufacturing industries and an exceedingly
flourishing agriculture. (2)
Germany with poor soil, unfavorable climate, bad geographical
conditions and a somewhat intractable peasantry possessed a prosperous
and vigorously expanding agriculture. The answer to this appears to
be attributed to the methodical and economical traits of the German
people. If before Yiforld War I a man took a railroad trip through
the British Isles he noticed chiefly grass fields, which covered
sixty percent of the United Kingdom, but he rarely saw cereals
growing. If he took a railway journey through Germany, he would have
(1) Stolper, Gustave, "German Economy", Reynal and Hitchcock,
Hew York, 1940, P. 42.
(2) Ibid, P. 43
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seen chiefly cereals, which, in that country took up more than sixty
percent of the agricultural lands. Every available plot of ground
was utilised for growing crops in the agricultural areas and liberal
subsidies were provided by the government to encourage crop rotation
and the use of fertilizers and other products which would increase
and prolong productivity of the land.
The German State railways, beginning their rise in 1879,
largely contributed to the phenominal advance of the German industries
to the position they occupied immediately prior to the outbreak of Vforld
War I. Suffering from exploitation and financial maneuverings similar
to those in the United States in their infancy, the German railways were
taken over by the State at the behest of Prince Bismarck in 1879.
From that point onward a truly national railway policy was pursued.
Railroads were built where they were wanted by the population or by
the State. The State at the same time did not discourage competition
and encouraged the construction of waterways and electrical trams.
The freight tariff was greatly simplified and changes were as uniform
and as easy to compile as postal charges. There were only a few
classes of goods and a small simplified rate book was furnished to the
customers who could almost instantly arrive at the cost of transporta-
tion of goods between any two points, (l)
State railwayswere a great success in Germany prior to
World Yfar I, but whether they could survive in a democracy without
meddling and inefficiency is an excellent topic for debate.
(1) Clapham, J. H., "Economic Development of France and Germany",
University Press, Cambridge, 1921, P. 155.
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Recognizing the importance of cheap transport and of an
alternative transport system Germany steadily extended, enlarged and
improved her natural and artificial waterways and kept on expanding and
improving them. Natural earthbanks of rivers were replaced by solid
masonry walls. The river beds were narrowed and deepened, the rocks
which were a danger to navigatioh blasted away, and provisions were
made to prevent ice forming during seven winters thus closing rivers and
canals. Numerous well equipped harbors and quays were built by all
towns within reach of inland navigation, and gradually all the more
important waterways were perfected and improved.
If it were not for the existence of the German waterways
it is questionable whether the industrial rise of Germany would have
been so marked. The iron industry was completely dependent upon
waterways for the important iron ore, which had to be carried over huge
distances to the Ruhr coal district to be smelted. Certain valuable
products and by-products of the German mines and iron works, and the
more bulky chemical products could be sold abroad and in Germany solely
because of the cheapness of water transportation. In many cases
the profit was cut so fine that an increase of the freight charges by
about one-fiftieth of a penny a ton per mile would have killed
important industries. Germany’s industrial success was no doubt due
to a large extent to the immense assistance she received from her
waterways. (1)
No account of German industrialization from 1870 to 1914
(1) Barker, J. E., "Modern Germany", E. P. Dutton and Company,
New York, 1919, P. 243.
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would "be complete without giving consideration to the leading part
played by the German banks. The dynamics of the German economy can
only be understood if we realize that one of the most powerful stimuli
to industrialization came from the peculiar banking system of Germany.
The great difference between the German and Anglo-American banking
systems becomes apparent in the difference in meaning of ’’bank" in
Germany and in England and the United States. The German bank was a
combination of commercial bank, investment bank and investment trust,
which required backing by a central bank.
From the very moment of their inception the German banks
were planned mainly as instruments for the financing of industries, not
as credit banks after the English or American pattern. As a result
industry and banking advanced together in Germany, and it is interesting
to note that all the great banks originated in periods of industrial
expansion.
5. Shipping and Commerce.
During the middle of the last century German shipbuilding
was rather flourishing. Numerous shipyards on the Elbe, the Vfeser,
and along the North Sea Coast were building wooden sailing ships for
which the raw material was cheap and near at hand. However, when iron
steamships began to displace wooden sailing ships, the German ship-
yards declined and Great Britain, who was then practically the only
industrial country in the world, easily obtained monopoly in iron ship-
building. In 1885 German shipbuilding was practically non-existent.
-
20 -
but in 1906 Germany was building a greater tonnage than all the con-
tinental countries put together. By wise, far-seeing, determined
state action were the German shipbuilding and shipping industries
artificially established, fostered and developed. The astonishing
success of the German shipbuilding industry was due partly to its
excellent management and organization, partly to the application of
science and experience to industry, and partly to the harmonious co-
ordination and cooperation of the various economic factors which in
more individualistic countries were not co-ordinated.
Shipbuilding of necessity brought about an economic
expansion of Germany outside of her own frontiers. It should be noted
that the expansion of her industries had raised Germany to the rank of
England. The two were the most important industrial exporters in the
world. In 1880 German foreign trade ranked fourth among the exporting
nations, that is, after Great Britain, France and the United States.
Soon Germany gained second place (after the United States), a position
which she maintained up to Yforld War I. (1)
The growth of German foreign trade from the foundation of
the Reich to World War I was a good index of the head long expansion of
the German economy in the last two decades of this era. Germany’s
rapid industrialization was also reflected in the composition of her
foreign trade. The ratio of industrial finished products to total exports
rose from thirty eight percent in 1873 to sixty three percent in 1913. But
the industrial affluence and the exporting capacity of the country were
(1) Bruck, Yif. F., "Social and Economic History of Germany",
Harper Brothers, New York, 1937, P. 248.
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entirely dependent upon the importation of raw materials and food
stuffs, which by far exceeded the exports of finished goods.
6. Desire for a Colonial Empire.
Bismarck’s Prussia was a military and not a naval state.
Hamburg and Bremen, Germany’s two outlets to the world at large, were
not Prussian and did not even belong to the German Zollverein.
Prussia’s aspirations were centered on Continental Europe exclusively
and Bismarck himself was originally a declared enemy of the colonial
policy. But when the turn in foreign trade policy occurred, Germany
modified her attitude towards colonial problems and the ” colonial
empire” made it 6 entry.
The slender value of the German colonies for her economic
life may be learned from the following facts: On the eve of World War I,
German capital working in the colonies was a little over five hundred
million marks or two percent of the total German capital invested
abroad. German capital was primarily employed in the colonies in
building up railroad systems, port facilities, plantations and mines.
Exports including diamonds, rubber, and vegetable oil products did not
exceed eighty three million marks in 1912. The colonies were, there-
fore, of no value for supplying German industry with raw materials nor
could they furnish a sizable market for German industries. In 1913 less
than one half of one percent of total German exports went to her own
colonies. It is, therefore, doubtful if had not German colonial power
been broken up by Yforld War I she would have become a rival of Great
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Britain as a colonial empire. (1)
7. Labor.
As had been the case in England, the German workers were
long prohibited by anti-union legislation from organizing into trade
unions. Only after the liberal era of the 1860*8 was well under way
were most of these restrictions allowed to lapse. First among the
federal states to repeat the anti organization laws was Saxony to be
later followed by the Trades Code adopted by the Reich in 1871. This
agreement guaranteed freedom of organization to the workers and soon
afterward the first trade unions were formed.
In marked contrast to unions in the Anglo-Saxon countries,
the German unions were built up by central organizations that were
decidedly political in character. Thus from the beginning to its end in
1933, the German trade unions movement was politically oriented and
closely aligned with the major political parties in Germany.
This unionization was paralleled by similar activities
among the employees, who also formed centralized associations. In the
entire history of the unions the relations between employers and employees
remained an exclusive affair of these two groups. The State kept out
completely, except of course for the protection that civil law accorded
industrial agreements as well as other types of contracts. The
industrial courts formed in 1891, however, were the first step in the
direction of state regulation of employer-employee relations. But beyond
that, relations between employers or their associations and trade unions
were not much regulated before Y/orld War I. The whole technique of
(1) Barker, J. H # , "Modern Germany", E. P. Dutton and Company,
New York, 1919, P. 103.
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collective bargaining developed very slowly, and the number of such
agreements remained small. The rapid upsurge of German industry
and the relative mildness of the business cycles of that period on
both the up and down swings helped to keep labor troubles within
moderate limits as to the number and intensity of strikes. (1)
8. Cooperatives.
Together with labor unions the cooperatives also built
up their own organizations. Following the example of Britain, con-
sumers cooperatives were formed, which, in both membership and
activities were second only to the British organizations of the same
kind. Small tradesmen and farmers found much economic support in
cooperative organizations, primarily in credit associations for
traders and farmers respectively. Buying and selling cooperatives
were also formed but were chiefly limited to the Agrarian groups.
9. Social Legislation.
The idea of social reform originated in countries with
older industrial traditions, primarily in England, not in Germany.
Social reform was meant to break the forces of capitalism wherever
their full sway could breed or had bred obvious social defects. But
in no other country had the idea of social reform impressed the minds
of the people so deeply as in Germany, or been carried so fully to the
point of a whole social philosophy.
In 1883 the first social insurance law came into being.
Based on previous voluntary arrangements, it provided for a compulsory
health insurance for workers. Accident insurance for workers was
(1) Clapham, J. H., ’’Economic Development of France and Germany,
University Press, Cambridge, 1921, P. 329.
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organized the next year, followed in 1889 by old age and sickness
insurance
,
Thus, among the workers of all countries the Germans were
the first to be protected against the worst social dangers to which they
were exposed, with the exception of unemployment, which aw yet had not
existed in sufficient numbers to be termed a social evil. If a worker
or his wife fell ill, the health insurance fund provided adequate medical
and financial aid, placed them in hospitals and sanitoriums and provided
for their medicine. 7/henever a worker had an accident, the compensation
fund took over all medical costs. Whenever he became partly or totally
disabled, or reached age sixty-five he received a pension providing an
adequate living. If he died before reaching sixty-five years of age the
widow and orphans were entitled to an annuity.
The cost of accident insurance was borne by the employer
alone, those of health insurance were shared by employer and employee,
in the old age and sickness insurance the Reich was from the beginning
the third participant. According to their contributions, employers and
employees had a share in the management of the social insurance
organizations.
Other protective legislation enacted included a law passed
in 1891 which provided for a maximum working day of eleven hours for
women and ten hours for childreri. Night work for women and children was
prohibited as was the employment of children under fourteen in industry
and trade. Free Sundays and various hygenic rules and working conditions
requirements were also set before the turn of the nineteenth century, (l)
(1) Stolper, Gustave, "German Economy", Reynal and Hitchcock,
New York, 1940, P. 77,
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CHAPTER II
WORLD WAR I
A. Underlying Causes ,
Germany’s phenominal rise to an industrial world power, well
"balanced both within herself and as a member of the world economy, was
destroyed "by a sudden catastrophe. This catastrophe known to us as
World 'War I broke out July 2b, 1914, eventually involved twenty-nine
nations and concluded with the Armistice which took place November 11,
191b.
1. Background.
The underlying causes go far back into the complexities
of European diplomatic and economic history. These include racial
conflicts, lust for conquest and trade, and hostile division of major
Europan powers into the triple alliance and triple entente respectively.
This smoldering fire of international rivalry and intrigue blazed into
violence with the assassination of Archduke Francis Ferdinand, heir
apparent to the Austria-Hungary throne on June 2b, 1914, at Sarajevo
Bosnia. Assured of German support, Austria-Hungary sent a severe
forty-eight hour ultimatum to Serbia, accusing that country of plotting
to undermine and destroy the Hapsburg Empire. Austria-Hungary declared
war on July 28, 1914, despite pleas for arbitration from other nations,
and a Serbian reply which could be interrupted as a partial compliance
to Austria-Hungary's demands. Russia seeing that its interests were
menaced in southeastern Europe ordered mobilization of its armies
which was construed by Germany as a threat to its ally Austria-Hungary.
.
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Germany subsequently declared war against Russia on August 1, 1914,
and against France mobilised as Russia’s ally, August 3, 1914.
German troops proceeded to violate the neutrality of Belgium which
brought on a declaration of war from Great Britain, August 4, 1914.
2. German Finances.
Germany and German industry had the tremendous task of
providing alone, without economic and financial help from abroad for
all four years of the war. Germany’s fate economically was sealed by
the blockade which forced her into an involuntary autarchy although
up to the time of the war Germany had participated in world trade
more than any other nation except England.
When World War I broke out on August 4, 1914, Germany
was economically completely unprepared for a war that was to expose her
for several years to the immense endurance test of an economic and
financial isolation. German statesmen obviously were considering a
lightaing campaign and were not prepared for a struggle of many years
with an adversary of equal strength. The First Battle of the Marne
which ended the German military dream was also the Battle of the Marne
for the German war economy. (1)
In one economic sphere alone did Germany have something
like a plan according to which, in case of war, she could begin to act
on the very first day. This was the sphere of money and credit and state
finance. The German Government had not troubled their heads how, if
the war came, they would procure bread for the people and raw materials
for the army. But they had taken to heart the old adage that three
(l) Material secured from author's study of Germany' s World War I
economy while associated with a federal intelligence agency in
World ’War II.
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things are indispensable to wage modern war; namely, money, money,
and more money. It soon became apparent, however, that the money
they could provide was not of much use in a modern war.
A series of inflationary acts followed in rapid succession
initiated by the discontinuance of redeeming bank notes in gold brought
about by the hoarding of gold by a war scared public. The most im-
portant step towards unrestrained inflation was the establishment of
Loan Banks who had the power to make loans on securities disqualified
as collateral by the Reich Bank. Besides these Loan Banks extended
credits to the Federal States and municipalities as well as to war
corporations and it was their designated task to make advances for
subscriptions to the war loans. It is interesting to note that the
funds of the Loan Banks were procured very simply by means of the
printing press. Loan Bank notes, as they were called, were issued
to the full amount of the outstanding credits of the banks as legal
tender and were partly taken up by the Reich Bank and partly placed
in immediate circulation.
The financial war plan of the Government was clear as it
was simple and premeditated. The printing press had been chosen to
fulfill the war needs of the Reich and the increased credit require-
ments of private business. It was planned, in due time, to refund
by a war loan the credits for which the Reich had drawn upon the Reich*
s
bank. But it was never contemplated to cover the war expenditures by
means of taxation, (l)
(1) See footnote preceding page
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3. Inflation.
Since most of the war loans had the appearance of being
compulsory loans, it would have been very tempting to save the
interest payments by replacing the loans with taxes. Equally import-
ant psychological considerations would have prompted a drastic in-
crease in taxation in order to pacify the feelings of the public
against "war profiteers”, the industrialists and tradesmen, who
enjoyed good business in the war boom period. Nevertheless tax
increases were resorted to only as a last resort and as late as 1915
it was reiterated in the Reichtag that the government’s intention
was to finance the war exclusively by means of credit.
Only very slowly, under the combined pressure from public
opinion and the political parties, did the methods of financing change
somewhat. War taxes were imposed on war profits, turnover of goods from
producer to consumer, and other, chiefly indirect, taxes were added,
of which the most important were coal and transportation taxes.
During the entire war the German stock exchanges were
closed, and quotations of foreign currencies were not published.
Therefore, the consequenoes of inflation on the quotation of securities
and foreign exchanges remained unknown to the public. The mark was,
however, being quoted on the exchanges of the neutral countries, and
there the effects of the German inflation could be gauged by the
continually sinking value of the mark. At the end of the war the mark
on the neutral exchanges had fallen to about one half the gold parity, (l)
(1) Material secured from author’s study of Germany’s World War economy
while associated with a federal intelliger.ee agency in World 'War II.
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B • Militarized Economy .
At the outbreak of the war, Germany was the greatest military land
power in the world. But in one very crucial respect, to become de-
cisive after four years of struggle, she was at a disadvantage com-
pared with the Allies in that she was not master of the seas.
Germany was forced to enter into a small limited economic sphere with
her oto allies. Inside this sphere close market relations were formed
and the German industries exchanged their products for the very limited-
surpluses of raw materials and foodstuffs of her allies. These
surpluses were increased somewhat by conquest in southern and eastern
Europe, but throughout the war the supplies were critical. Some trade
was kept up with the neutrals connected with Germany by a continental
frontier, however, these nations had little to spare as the British
blockade effected them almost as badly as it did Germany. The
blockade had qualitative and quantitative effects that were to prove
fatal in the long run. The qualitative effect was that Germany had no
access to certain raw materials she herself possessed either not at all
or in insufficient quantities. These materials, notably metals, rubber
and oil were indispensable as implements of war. The quantitative
effect of the blockade was that Germany was confined strictly to her
own economic resources, from which she had to bolster up the even
weaker resources of her allies by various economic and financial
expedients. The Allies, however, could not only dispose of their own
production, but in addition had free access to the production of the
whole world including that of the United States, (l)
(1) See footnote preceding page
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By cutting Germany off from all foreign resources, the blockade
inevitably led to her downfall. For at the time of entering the war
her economic life was intrinsically free although much more inter-
spersed with governmental regulations than in the western countries.
When the war ended, she had a thoroughly militarized economy. The
shape of this economic organization was determined by dire necessity,
not by a plan well thought out in advance. Thus business was not
militarized with one stroke according to plan, but, as the war
dragged on, militarization gradually developed as scarcity appeared
in one field after another.
C. Food .
A highly industrialized country with a densely concentrated urban
population like Germany is normally dependent upon an exchange of
domestic manufactured goods with the agricultural products of other
countries. Before Yforld War I Germany produced about two-thirds of
her food and fodder requirements, importing the other third. Germany,
cut off from her normal exports by the effectiveness of the British
blockade^ offered all sorts of inducements to agriculture to increase
production. This program enjoyed limited success only because the
men who tilled the soil were called to the colors and chemical plants
who in peace time produced fertilizer were busily engaged manufacturing
gunpowder, (l)
The German War Food Administration endeavored to use all the
instruments available to an administration organized along military
lines. It cut down consumption with ever increasing ruthlessness,
(1) Material secured from author's study of Germany's Vforld War economy
while associated with a federal intelligence agency in 'World War II.
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and mad© new regulations for distribution, using new technical methods.
Food consumption was regulated in states and the net drawn closer
around the hapless consumer. Apart from lifting agricultural tariffs
and clamping down embargoes on foodstuffs only a general law had been
passed at the beginning of the war that empowered authorities of
individual states to fix price limits on foodstuffs. It was not
contemplated at that time, however, to abolish the free food markets,
but only to prevent any runs or panics.
A maximum price system for foodstuffs without simultaneous regula-
tion of consumption is like a "pistol without barrel or shells". At
the time of a panic it may prove efficient, but as a permanent system
of distribution it must necessarily fail because it does not guarantee
equal distribution of food over a period of time.
Finally after the previously related system proved inadequate the
rationing system was introduced which was very similar to the rationing
systems utilized in World War II. All essential foodstuffs were
included and the individual rations were based upon the results of
harvests and foreign resources. However, this flexible portion of
the system only worked to the detriment of the consumer since only
revision downward took place. Extra rations were issued to expectant
mothers and children, laborers and persons engaged in activities re-
quiring physical exertion. The army, of course, was exempted from the
entire card system and the farmers were allowed larger rations than
the rest of the population. (1)
Agricultural production was also subjected to a system of com-
pulsory regulations, which remained ineffective insofar as they were
supposed to compel farmers' to increase their production. Frantically
the system of compulsory regulation was extended further and further.
(1) See footnote on preceding page.
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but none of these measures could stop the decay of agriculture that
resulted from the deficiency in farm labor, fertilizer and implements.
At the end of the war, not only had the livestock, on German farms
run down to an alarming low, but grain production had decreased to
less than half of the yields of prewar years. Together with the rest
of Germany, agriculture in 1918 had reached the end of its tether.
D. Industrial Regulation .
To a large extent modern war has become a matter of industrial
capacity. Under normal conditions the food needs of an army at war
are not a great deal in excess of what the standing army and re-
servists called to service required before mobilization. With the
food shortages evidenced in World War II the above statement may
appear ridiculous, however, it must be understood that we fed most of
the world in addition to ourselves this time. But what is measurably
increased from the very outset of a war is the demand for special
industrial products.
Walter Rathenaw, later a prominent foreign minister in the Vfeimar
Republic, presented to his government in 1914 a plan for the manage-
ment of the country's raw material supplies. As chief of the War
Material Office, he laid the foundation for the War Industry Administration.
The so-called war companies, founded by Rathenaw, had a certain
relationship with the mixed-ownership companies developed prior to the
war. In the war companies elements of private and public ownership
formed a peculiar mixture, in respect to both their legal setup and the
powers in control. Usually private stock or limited liability companies
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were organized, but differed from genuine private companies in that
they acted as trustees for the government and administered the pro-
cessing of government controlled materials. In fact the companies
were controlled jointly by the Government and the original owners,
and as far as remaining under private control they were regarded as
autonomous organs of industry under government control and for public
purposes.
Necessarily these war companies degenerated rapidly. On the other
hand, they were blamed for allegedly permitting excessive war profits
to the industries connected with them, and it is true that they could
not prevent profits from being made, although it was one of their
tasks to keep profits of their member companies within bounds. On
the other hand, the basic principle of self-government was certain to
be more and more curtailed with the growing scarcity of raw materials,
and the war companies were transformed into purely bureaucratic agencies.
In the first war years the Government confined its measures to the
industrial sphere: a. Demanding that producers sell scarce and
critical materials to war companies, b. Fixing maximum prices, c.
Reselling the raw materials to the processor for limited uses.
Distribution to manufacturers was according to the "urgency” of their
production which pretty well corresponded with the priority system of
the United States in World War II. (1)
The Hindenburg program was adopted during the latter part of 1916
because the Germans were determined to muster all economic forces and
break through the strategy of exhaustion applied by her enemies. This
(1) Stolpher, Gustave, "German Economy", Reynal and Hitchcock
New York, 1940, P. 117.
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program was supposed to complete the militarization of the nation 1 s
economic life. The law provided that every male German citizen from
seventeen to sixty years of age not in active military service was
to be regarded as a member of the Auxiliary Service. Actually the law
was made applicable principally to workers in the plants directly or
indirectly employed in war industry or on farms, who subsequently were
deprived of their freedom of movement. They could not change their
employment without the approval of the employer or a committee. If
war plants experienced difficulty in procuring necessary workers by
voluntary methods they could be conscripted into the plant.
The compulsory service of the war plants themselves consisted of
the drafting of their production for munition supplies. Plants not
adapted to this type of operation were deprived of their workers and
thus forced to shut down or amalgamate with other companies. State
control over private industrial companies went so far that unused
machinery could be drafted and allocated to other plants.
E. Labor Unions .
The labor unions prior to 1914 had achieved a great deal of
power in Germany and were closely interwoven into the texture of
German economic life. Officially, however, the unions lacked a clear
legal status in that they theoretically were still considered as
revolutionary and therefore illegitimate, although after the repeal
of the Anti-Socialist Laws no longer as illegal associations.
The Social-Democratic party with which the unions were connected
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dropped the pretense of being a revolutionary opposition party at
the beginning of the war and officially became a loyal opposition
party. The change in the party’s status had its influence upon the
labor unions whose power was increased almost automatically. Al-
though the unions gained an additional advantage by the rise in
industrial war requirements, they did not press this advantage openly
when negotiating with employers. Also German unions and employers
agreed to suspend all labor strife for the duration of the war.
A natural consequence of the war inspired shortage of labor was
that recently acquired real power of the unions was not hampered in
any way by the official renounciation of the strike weapon.
Despite maximum price legislation and compulsory management of
material resources, the war years were a period of rising prices.
Wages, however, tended to lag behind prices. In an endeavor to stop
this source of social unrest, authorities began to take some interest
in employer-employee relations. They initiated negotiations between
unions and employers, set minimum wages as a condition for the award
of government orders, and instituted conciliation committees on which
employers and employees were equally represented.
Workers’ committees were set up as a result of demand by the Social-
Democratic Party who refused to consent to the militarisation of
war workers unless the workers’ interests could be safeguarded by
workers’ committees. In every plant with fifty or more workers, these
committees were formed by secret ballot among the employees on the
basis of proportional representation. These workers' committees were
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the immediate predecessors of the shop-council system inaugurated
by the Yfeimer Constitution, which was destined to become an important
part of the German labor system. (1)
F. The Defeat .
The military history of World War I leaves no doubt as to which
side commanded the superior forces in the last phase of the war. Slowly
but surely the ultimate limits in the exploitation of all German
resources came into sight. In technical equipment the German Army was
surpassed more and more by Allied Armies who were finally strengthened
by the accession of the new American ally, the greatest industrial
power in the vforld.
There is, however, no doubt that a number of subtle moral factors
contributed to the defeat among which the morale of the army and
civilians was paramount. The German nation from which for four years
the maximum of life, limb and wealth had been exacted was at last
forced to realize that it was doomed to starvation, its submarine
warfare had failed and it had a new enemy; namely, the most powerful
nation in the Western World. The breakdown of morale in the economic
sphere was evidenced by black market activities and a wave of strikes
which were almost exclusively called in protest of the distressing
food shortages.
Although the German military blamed the defeat on a "stab in the
back" administered by the homefront, it would appear that the almost
superhuman sacrifices imposed on the people by the war government
slowly undermined the power of resistance and the final collapse was
caused by military, economic and physiological processes, not by
political factors.
(1) Stolper, Gustave, "German Economy", Reynal and Hitchcock,
New York, 1940, P. 124.
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CHAPTER III
GERMANY UP TO THE THIRD REICH
A. Weimar Republic .
The revolution that followed the military collapse brought a
fundamental change in Germany’s political structure. The economic
changes were much less revolutionary once several timid attempts at
nationalization of the key industries had failed.
It is true that the economic structure of the Germany of 1932 was
very different from that of 1914, In itself this economic structure
would have been ripe for a Socialist regime. The tendency to allow
economic relations to be controlled by the state had originated long
before the war and became dominant because of the war.
The German Republic had a brief but adventurous life. From both
a political and economic point of view we may distinguish three well-
defined periods in the comparitively short span of fourteen years.
The first laste,d five years* from November, 1918, to November,
1923. Politically it was the period of the worst disorder and of
dangerous attempts on the life of the young Republic, while economically
it was dominated by the inflation. The era of political unrest, of
Putsches, and of political murders came to an end on the very same
day of the inflation. On November 9, 1923, the musical-comedy team of
Hitler and Ludendorff failed in their Munich Putsch and on November
15, 1923, the currency was stabilized.
The second period lasted until the end of 1929. It was terminated
by the death of Gustav Stresemann, the last Foreign Minister of the
Republic to enjoy both national and international confidence and
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authority, Stresemann died in October 1929, about the time of the
collapse of the great American boom. Politically and economically,
this was the time of the flowering of Weimar Republic, German
democracy had apparently been consolidated, and this political
stabilization was accompanied by an economic boom on a truly American
scale.
The third phase, which lasted until the end of 1932, was the
industrial, agricultural and banking crisis. Like the boom period, it
can be only measured by American standards. There was only one
difference between the United States and Germany, but it was very funda-
mental, America’s democracy was established beyond any doubt and an
economic crisis could do nothing worse than bring about a change in
administration. The young German republic, on the contrary, was not
yet consolidated enought to survive the shock of the crisis.
1. The Versailles Treaty.
On entering the Yfeimar period of inflation and then of
reconstruction, Germany as a territorial unit was very different from
the powerful nation of pre-war years. Not only had she lost all her
colonies, whose value was doubtful, but also the Reich proper had
lost 13.1 percent of its pre-war territory and 10 percent of its
population of 1910. The territories lost permanently or until 1935
as a result of the Versailles Treaty and the partition of Upper
Silesia in 1921 were particularly rich in agricultural and mineral
resources. They comprised 14.6 percent of the arable area of Germany,
74.5 percent of German iron ore, 68.1 percent of her zinc ore, and
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26 percent of her coal production. Add to this the disruption of
the Genaan potash monopoly and the transformation of the Alsatian
textile industries from one of the most powerful factors of the
prosperous German textile industries into their most dangerous competi-
tors. Finally, it should not be overlooked that the loss of Alsace-
Lorraine, and even more the partition of Upper Silesia, destroyed some
of the most important interconnections of the industrial and trans-
portation systems. (1)
In other words, the loss of territory made Germany con-
siderably poorer than she had been. And this loss was immensely increased
by the deliveries in kind imposed on Germany by the Armistice and the
peace treaty. In addition to the armament material, including the
entire navy, Germany had to deliver:
All merchant ships exceeding 1,600 gross tons.
Half of the merchant ships between 1,000 and 1,600 gross tons.
One quarter of the fishing fleet.
One fifth of the lake and river fleet.
Five thousand locomotives, 150,000 railway cars, 5,000 motor trucks.
The entire Alsace-Lorraine railway system, with all rolling stock.
All material relinquished in the war zone.
All public property in the ceded territories and in the colonies. (2)
Furthermore, the allies reserved the right to confiscate
all German private property in their own countries and in the ceded
territories. (The German citizens were to be compensated by the Reich
Government). This threat was subsequently made good, except in ceded
(l) Stolper, Gustave, "German Economy", Reynal and Hitchcock,
New York, 1940, P. 135.
(2) Ibid, Page 136
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territories. The United States alone set a notable exception by
later returning the private property to its owners.
The crediting of all these deliveries to the reparation
account - at wholly arbitrary valuations - was purely fictitious. In
view of the huge size of reparation totals, this crediting was like
pouring water into a bottomless glass.
These deliveries and losses of territory resulted in a
tragic deterioration of German balance of payments. Larger food imports
became necessary; minerals until then mined in Germany had to be bought
abroad and the exports of others reduced. The loss of a merchant fleet
deprived Germany of income from transportation paid by foreign countries.
The loss of her capital investments abroad meant the loss of profits
and interest previously received from other nations. Even without
reparation payments, it would therefore have been very hard for
Germany to regain a balance in her foreign exchanges unless she were
accorded some help from other countries.
2. Reparations.
The reparations invoked rendered the German situation
definitely hopeless for the next fey; years. When on October 3, 1918,
Prince Von Baden's government accepted Wilson' s Fourteen Points, it thereby
accepted also the obligation to repair the devastated war zones. The
note sent by Secretary of State Lansing to the German Government on
November 5, 1918, defined this reparation obligation more precisely.
Germany was to undertake to repair the damages to private property,
except that of Russia, (l) Had the computation of these damages been
(1) Literally: "Compensation will be made by Germany for all damages
done to the civilian population of the Allies and to their
property by the agression of Germany by land, sea, and air."
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accurate, the obligations would probably have been balanced to a
large extent by the deliveries already enumerated. But the reparations
as ultimately defined had lost their relation to the original
American definition.
The Versailles Treaty first obligated Germany to pay all
cost of Allied occupation troops on German territory, this being a super-
imposed obligation not credited to the reparations account. Second,
it extended the reparations to include all (capitalized) pensions for
Allied combatants, swelling the reparation figures enormously. A
total sum for the reparation obligations was however not set by the
peace treaty, which provided only that the German Government was to
issue and deliver at once bonds to the amount of 100,000,000,000 gold
marks, of which 20,000,000,000 were to serve as security for the
interim payments up to May 1, 1921. Interest and amortization on the
rest were to be paid during the thirty subsequent years. This alone
implied an annual reparation payment of 1,000,000,000 gold marks,
after 1921, To the Reparation Commission, provided for by the peace
treaty,was assigned the task of deciding on the definite amount and
the mode of payment of the reparations total. The plan was to be com-
pleted by May 1, 1921. (l)
Although the peace treaty did not come into force until
January 10, 1920, it called for German payments of 20,000,000,000 gold
marks before May 1, 1921, against which the deliveries provided by it were
to be credited. Part of the rest of the amount was to be paid by
(1) Stolper, Gustave, "German Economy", Reynal and Hitchcock,
New York, 1940, P. 139.
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"deliveries in kind". On this count Germany was obligated to
deliver over a decade at least 38,000,000 tons of coal a year, and
huge quantities of chemicals and other commodities. The deliveries
in kind began, in fact, in August, 1919; that is before the peace
treaty came into force.
The following years up to the time of the Dawes Plan (1924)
were filled with bitter controversies over the amount and mode of repara-
tion payments. The Paris Resolutions of 1921 provided for the payment
of 21,000,000,000 gold marks in the first two years, 3,000,000,000
each in the following three years, 4,000,000,000 again for three more
years, 5,000,000,000 for the following three years, 6,000,000,000 for
the next thirty-one years, and in addition 26 percent of the proceeds
from German exports in each of these forty-two years. As the repara-
tion payments in themselves forced Germany to fantastically huge
exports, the 26 percent export duty constituted an additional repara-
tion burden that would rapidly rise from 2,000,000,000 to 3,000,000,000
marks per annum. (1)
Already at that time the Allies tried to make the Germans
accept this disastrous plan by occupying towns on the Rhine and in the
Ruhr Basin and impounding customs duties in the occupied territory.
The London Ultimatum was hardly closer to reality than the
Paris Resolutions. First, Germany’s reparation debt was fixed at
132,000,000,000 gold marks, an amount which according to Lord neynes, the
famed British economist, exceeded by three times Germany’s ability to pay. (2)
(1) Stolper, Gustave, "German Economy", Reynal and Hitchcock,
Hew lork, 1940, P. 140.
(2) Keynes proposed to put the reparation obligations at 42,000,000,000
gold marks of which 11,000,000,000 should be regarded as offset by
the delivery of the ships. The balance would be paid in thirty
annuities of 1,050,000,000 marks.
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The reparation debt was to bear 6 percent annually in interest and
amortization and gold mark bonds were to be issued by the Reparation
Commission and serviced by reparation payments.
The reparation plan was presented to Germany in the form
of an ultimatum. Should the German Government not accept within six days,
the Ruhr Basin would be occupied. The German Reichstag accepted, by
a bare majority and the plan was executed until 1922 at which time the
Germans begged for a moratorium on cash payments up to the end of 1924,
declaring themselves willing to keep up deliveries in kind to the
maximum previously agreed upon. The moratorium was not granted, but in
September, 1922, it was agreed that besides the goods in kind, the
Germans were to pay 270,000,000 marks in six-month treasury certificates, (l)
/
3. Inflation.
German inflation was initiated by the London Ultimatum and
soon the increase in note circulation progressed at such a rate that,
notably in the last phases of the period, the printing presses failed
literally to keep up with the required tempo. In the last months preceding
the financial collapse more than three hundred paper mills worked day and
night to deliver note paper to the Reich's bank and one hundred and
fifty printing establishments had two thousand presses running twenty-
four hours a day printing Reichbank notes.
This unfortunate situation, unparalleled in modern history,
was caused by the credits the Reichbank granted to the Government and
equally as important by its inflationary credits granted to business.
)l) Stolper, Gustave, "German Economy", Reynal and Hitchcock,
New York, 1940, P. 141.
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4. Profiteers and Victims.
Immense fortunes were accumulated by those possessing
I
the ability and necessary banking connections to procure a maximum of
commercial credits and to invest them rapidly in "physical values".
These financiers were able to amass huge fortunes almost over night
at the expense of the middle and poorer class who were pauperised by
their activities.
All property invested at fixed money values such as
government bonds, mortgages, mortgage bonds, and savings bank deposits
became worthless thereby condemning the middle class to economic
annihilation. Some relief was afforded to the middle class by
revaluing long term money debts at a certain percentage of their
original gold value. Mortgages were also revalued at 25 percent and all
other debts at smaller percentages.
Finally, however, the collapse of the monetary system
became complete, and the disaster of depreciation overtook everyone
regardless of economic station. Money was no longer able to fulfill its
proper function in a modern economic system. People reverted to bartering
of goods and foreign money flowed into domestic circulation. Calcu-
lations in business and every kind of economic relation became more
and more confused. Finally, the disturbances in all parts of the
economic mechanism became so serious that, despite a further rise in
prices, industrial employment began to grow.
5. Stabilization.
As mentioned in preceding pages, the cash resources of
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the population had dwindled to an infinitesimal amount when expressed
in gold. It could be taken for granted that these cash reserves
would reassume normal dimensions from the very moment the public be-
came convinced that further depreciation was no longer imminent. An
increase in the circulation up to the new saturation point of cash
reserves held by the public would thus have no inflationary effects,
but would merely prevent a deflationary pressure on prices. A fairly
wide margin existed for the Government to provide intermediary re-
sources by means of the printing press without incurring the danger
of new inflationary symptons.
B. The Dawes Plan .
In October, 1923, the President of the United States, Calvin
Coolidge, took up a suggestion previously made by Secretary of State
Hughes that the reparation problem be submitted to an inquiry by mon-
political experts. On November 30, 1923, the Reparation Commission
nominated two committees of experts to study the reparation problem and
to propose a new order of payments. The more important of these
committees worked under the chairmanship of General Charles C. Dawes,
later Vice-President of the United States. After careful study they
laid a new reparation plan before the Reparation Commission which
accepted it. Three months later all governments involved signified
that they would abide by its provisions and on September 1, 1924, it
went into force.
Although the Dawes Plan was merely a provisional solution of the
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reparations problem it had two decisive merits as compared with all
former plans. First, it replaced the fantastic annuities of former
plans by amounts that seemed reasonable and just. Second, it was
acknowledged by the plan that Germany needed a pause for recovery.
The experts realized that the German economy, after almost a decade
of the most harrowing experiences, must be granted a respite in which
to produce the surplus goods required for delivery abroad. This
respite was to be divided into two periods, one of quasi total
indulgence and one of a partial resumption of payments.
For five years the Dawes Plan worked with admirable precision.
All payments were made promptly and exactly on the appointed days in
the agreed amounts. The replacement of the Dawes Plan in 1930 by the
Young Plan was by no means a consequence of Germany’ s inability to
fulfill the Dawes obligations. It merely expressed the general wish
td replace the "provisional’' Dawes Plan with a "final" reparation plan.
C . The Young Plan .
The Young Plan agreed upon by the Allies and Germany on January
30, 1930, was based upon the recommendations of a committee of experts
headed by Owen D. Young, Chairman of the Board, General Ilectric
Company. It was supposed to set up a final schedule of payments which
it did by making the annuities terminate in 1988. For the first
two years the plan provided for a considerable reduction from
2.500.000.
000 to 1,700,000,000 marks each year. Then in slow pro-
gression the maximum annuities were to be reached in 1965-66 at
2.429.000.
000 marks annually. After that a degression was to bring
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annuities down to 898,000,000 marks in the last reparation year
1987-88.
The Jfoung Plan not only allowed a substantial immediate reduction
in reparation payments; it also freed Germany from the humiliation of
foreign controlling agencies. However, from the German viewpoint these
advantages were offset by a project to commercialize part of the
reparations program. The Allies hoped by this expedient to raise very
substantial amounts on the capital markets of the world, particularly
in the United States. Allied circles at that time favored the idea
of a huge international loan, whose interest was to be serviced by
Germany and credited to her on the reparations account. It was also
believed that commercial debts were safer than political debts. The
Young Loan issued in June 1930, netted as much as 1,300,000,000 marks,
but the issuing of further portions was checked by the outbreak of
the "Depression”. (1)
D. Prosperity Era 1924-1930 .
The economic recovery in the second phase of the Weimar Republic
was unparalleled in scope and intensity. What made it all the more
incredulous was that at this time Germany was pledged to pay a war
indemnity unheard of in the history of any country. However, her
industries managed to attain once more an amazing standard in
technological equipment and she began to regain the leading position
in those branches in which she had led before World ’War I; namely,
chemical, electrical, optical, engineering and textile industries.
It was not merely a figure of speech to say that in these six
(1) Stolper, Gustav, "German Economy", Reynal and Hitchcock,
New York, 1940, P. 173.
.
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years a new Germany was built up. This is true not only of the
industrial spheres but also urban housing stimulated by state subsidies
experienced a terrific growth. Slum areas were cleared and replaced
by bright, artistic, large and small scale housing units. Municipalities
competed with another in constructing playgrounds, swimming pools,
schools and hospitals. Transmission lines of electric power were
rebuilt and modernized. The merchant fleet ceded to the Allies was
almost completely replaced by new and more effective units. In 1926
already German exports had regained the prewar level of more than
10,000, OCX), 000 marks; in 1929, they exceeded the 1913 figures by 34
percent, despite the loss of territory in Europe and of all colonies.
E. The Collapse of the Republic.
In the course of fifteen years, three catastrophes befell Germany.
The first, the military catastrophe of 1918 gave birth to the Republic.
From the second, the utter collapse of the currency in 1923, the
young republic seemingly recovered miraculously, but in reality the
social repercussions and consequences of the inflation were a continual
drain on its vitality. The third and final catastrophe, the economic
crisis of the 1930’s resulted in the downfall of the Republic.
1. Agrarian Crisis.
The German agricultural crisis was essentially a problem
of the "rye belt" and rye had long been an issue in German agriculture.
In years of poor crops, rye was in great demand whereas in prosperous
years the price was determined not by its use as bread cereal but
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rather by the amount used as fodder. This particular economic
formula may be compared to the similar ’’corn hog’’ ration familiar to
all students of economics in this country. The farmers in the rye
belt were over burdened with debt and insolvent, and unfortunately the
rye belt was largely the area of the big estates. These estates were
occupied by the Prussian landed aristocracy, better known as Junkers.
This group, although considerably undermined by the progressive social
and political legislation fostered by the Republic, still occupied
a very awe inspiring position. They remained bitter towards the
Republic because of the attempts to break up and divide their vast
estates when Chancellor Heinrich Brtining, now professor of Government
at Harvard University, initiated emergency decrees to liquidate their
lands. They appealed to one of their number President Paul von Hinden-
burg who brought about the downfall of the Brtining Government.
2. The Banking Crisis .
German banking had developed the mixed type of deposit
and investment banks, a type of bank particularly vulnerable in a crisis.
The banks in the boom period failed to set aside an adequate part of
their inflowing capital as reserves and invested their depositors’
money in venturesome and risky industrial and trading enterprises.
Two events brought the banking crisis to a climax. The
success of the National Socialist Party in the Reichstag elections of
September 1930, caused the first panic among creditors. The second blow
came from the Austrian banking crisis, which in May, 1931, culminated in
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the crash of the Austrian Creditanstalt, one of the oldest and
largest international banks in Central Europe. The September elections
resulted in a rush of withdrawals of foreign deposits, but after the
Austrian alarm signal a general run on the banks came so swiftly that
it could no longer be mastered.
3. Moratorium.
The Government proclaimed a bank holiday in order to pre-
vent open bankruptcy of the banks. All bank deposits of large banks
were guaranteed by the Government and became in effect state banking
institutions. Also a moratorium on foreign short-term credits was
combined with rigid regulation and restriction of the foreign exchange
market
•
4. Deflation.
Germany had become a prisoner of her own inflation
experiences and the deflation policy entailed heavy sacrifices and re-
mained largely ineffective. The horrors of the inflation of the early
1920’s were still too fresh in the minds of the people to allow the
Government to pursue a policy which they believed might foretell another
crisis.
Prices and wages already government controlled were forced
down to the very level they would have achieved under a natural elastic
system. The difference between a natural and inforced price decline
is, however, that nobody can find who is responsible for the former
but the government is always blamed for the latter. The "consumer"
is benefited by a deflation policy, but the "producer" is hurt and
the latter proved the most articulate in making his feelings known
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in the right places. Unemployment continued to rise to a total of
6,031,000 in March, 1932. It was decided to abruptly about face and
reverse the economic policy of the country by the Bruning Government.
They decided to extend credit facilities but at the same time to safe-
guard any inflationary trends by strict government regulation of
prices. However, in the midst of these preparations Bruning and his
cabinet were dismissed.
5 . The End of the Republic .
On May 30, 1932, Dr. Brlfning was replaced by Franz von
Papen, who was called upon to establish an "authoritarian" regime, at
least for the period of transition. Von Papen, a wily diplomat and con-
servative Roman Catholic plunged into his duties with gusto. However,
he pursued a high handed policy and soon alienated the factions that
backed him in forming the government. The power behind the throne,
a political general, Kurt von Schleicher, who had made and over-thrown
Bruning and made and backed von Papen had to step to the fore himself
and form a government because of the wave of political strikes
instigated by hostile Nazis and Communists. Von Schleicher attempted
to gain the support of the trade unions and at the same time split
the Nazi party by winning over its left wing. However, this plan
never matured in that von Papen took his vengeance by plotting with
Hitler to force von Schleicher’s retirement. Hitler thus ascended to
power in Germany despite the fact that less than 44 percent of German
voters had cast their ballots for National Socialist Party candidates
aspiring to seats in the Reichstag.
.• t
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CHAPTER IV
THE THIRD REICH
A. The National Socialist Movement,
1. Beginning.
At the time of its foundation, the National Socialist
movement was not an economic movement. Both its initial expansion and
final coming into power, however, occurred in periods when Germany was
"beset by critical economic crisis and the people were desperately seeking
a system offering relief.
The party was founded in 1920, when the Yfeimar regime was
battling in vain against the rapidly rising tide of inflation. It took
its first revolutionary action in 1923 when, during the French invasion
of the Ruhr district, the German currency and with it thewhole economic
system collapsed completely. For a few years the Nazi movement
appeared to have died out and in the Reichstag’s of the 1920‘s the
party was represented by about a dozen members. This representation
jumped suddenly to 107 in September 1930 and from that point until
the end of the Republic by Hitler’s appointment as Chancellor on
January 30, 1933, the constitution of the German Republic was non-
existent.
2. Capitalism and the Party.
The National Socialist party was from the outset an anti-
capitalist party and as such was fighting and competing against
Marxism. Born at a time immediately after World War I when social-
ization of Germany and perhaps of all Europe seemed inevitable to
many, the Nazi program attacked the problem in a way that was not new
.'
- 53 -
to the Weimar Constitution. The Nazis adopted and exaggerated the
principles of Weimar rather than attacking them which aided in wooing
the masses.
By accepting the principle of the citizen being subservient
to the state, the Nazis emphasized their antagonism towards a democratic,
competitive society and in a sense practiced Socialism. The masses
were told that only exploitation of the people resulted from following
democratic capitalism.
Among the most effective slogans introduced by National
Socialism none made a more lasting impression on the German people than
"Break the Bonds of Interest Slavery". The terrifying years of un-
controlled inflation that followed World War I created a fear of high
prices and worthless money that could not be controlled. The Nazis
played ppon these fears of the people with reckless abandon, however
it is interesting to note that the National Socialist movement which
benefited so immensely from inflation was itself predicated upon a
strictly regulated inflationist program.
3. State Control of Industry .
The nationalization of big industry was never attempted
as such after the Nazis came into power, but the socialization of the
entire productive machinery, both agricultural and industrial was
achieved by methods other than expropriation. The results of this
program was on an immeasurably more comprehensive scale than the
authors of the party program of 1920 probably ever imagined. In
fact, not only were the big trusts gradually but rapidly subjected to
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governmental control, "but so was every sort of economic activity,
leaving not much more than the empty title of private ownership.
Gradually but rapidly, out of the necessity first of creating employ-
ment and later of building up a huge armament system, grew an economic
dictator as well as a political dictator, (l)
4. Agriculture .
As early as the autumn of 1933, the whole agricultural
sector of Germany’s economic life was organized into a sort of public,
compulsory cartel including not only producers, landowners, and
tenants of every size of holding, but also the processors, wholesalers,
and retailers of agricultural products. Marketing Boards comparable
to the code authorities of the defunct N.lt.A. fixed prices, regulated
supplies and prescribed permissable charges for the various phases
of processing. For some products certain prescribed quantities could
be ordered for delivery by individual farmers but processors were
bound to confine themselves to certain qualities which were sold
through the organizations prescribed by the authorities. The farmer
was forced to grow what he was ordered to grow and had to use stipulated
types of seeds. He was even told what sort and what quantity of
fertilizer he should apply and he was under strict supervision with
respect to his technical methods.
(l) Sweezy, Maxim, ”The Structure of the Nazi Economy”, Harvard
University Press, Cambridge, 1941, P. 26.
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As the prices the farmer received were relatively
satisfactory and several good crops were had, the farmer was relatively
well off. Nevertheless, Germany did not come even close to the goal
of self sufficiency in food which the above program was destined to
achieve. As a matter of fact agricultural production from 1933 to 1938
showed very little increase despite increasing amounts of machinery,
fertilizer and cheap labor in the form of various youth organizations
of the party. (1)
5. Industry and Trade .
The complete German economy was an extremely complicated
organization which included without any exceptions everyone engaged in
business and commerce. They were subject to all the decrees, regulations
and controls the Government saw fit to order.
Within the framework of the comprehensive organization
every businessman was told what to produce, the methods of production
to be applied, how much coal and raw materials he was to be apportioned,
which materials he might and might not use, prices he was to pay for
products bought and prices to be charged for products sold. The
businessman was even told from whom he could accept orders, to whom
and through whom he could sell and the order of priority by which his
sales had to be made. If the businessman failed to carry out the
Government’s decrees, the courts and secret police would very effect-
ively either ruin him or make him conform.
The basic requisite for this military planned economy was of
course, complete control over exports and imports. Not a single carload could
(l) Stolper, Gustave, "German Economy", Reynal and Hitchcock,
New York, 1940, P. 245.
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cross a German border in either direction without & special permit
from the Government. No German was supposed to sell anything abroad
without such a permit and the importer could not buy where he could
get the best quality at the lowest price. On the other hand, the
exporter could not sell wherever he found a competitive opportunity.
The so-called Second Four Year Plan was announced by
Adolph Hitler in the following words at the Nuremberg Party rally of
September, 1936:
"Within four years Germany shall be independent from all
foreign countries in respect to all those materials which
it can produce at home by means of German ingenuity, our
mining, engineering*, and chemical industries. When the
process of rearmament has been completed, the labor now
employed therein will be diverted into productive channels
through the development of the great new German raw
material industry.”
That program as well as the entire organization of the
National Socialist economy had its precedent in the war economy developed
during the 1914-1918 blockade. At that time and ever since, Germany
was bent upon developing substitute materials and attaining a goal
of self sufficiency which was never realized. (1)
Apart from the development of substitute materials,
Germany made every effort to develop her own resources of raw materials
irrespective of costs. They included oil, flax, iron ore, copper and
zinc. Success however, was again not realized and Germany remained
dependent for more than two thirds of her consumption upon foreign supply,
primarily from Sweden which provided about 60 percent of Germany’s ore
imports.
Despite every effort to increase Germany’s foreign trade,
little progress was made from 1932 to 1939. T/hatever surplus could be
(1) Stolper, Gustave, "German Economy", Reynal and Hitchcock,
New York, 1940, P. 250.
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achieved in foreign trade was needed to pay a part of the foreign
debt service wherever the purchasing countries had the power to
withhold for this purpose the balance in their trade with Germany.
This was true of virtually all European creditor countries and as a
result Germany's foreign trade shifted more and more to the nations
of southeastern Europe, while trade with western Europe lagged. Sub-
stantial progress was also made in German trade with Latin American
Countries.
6. Financial Policy.
The financial policy of Nazi Germany was not developed
on a preconceived plan, rather it was improvised, and its methods modified
as needs arose. One aim however was very plain: The preservation of
the purchasing power of the mark. The Government realized very early
that with rapidly growing, deficits, government expenditure, and
credit expansion, nothing would prevent a rising tide of inflation if
the purchasing power of the masses was allowed to grow trith the money
supply. Therefore, from the very beginning, the Government insisted
on keeping waggs and prices rigidly fixed.
The income of the working class, however, rose because of
the rapidly expanding production and overtime pay. But at the same time
the limited supply of materials had to be reserved for the nation’s
military purposes which necessitated measures aimed at keeping con-
sumption down. Increased taxation and forced savings were used to
drain away the consumer income in excess of consumer goods.
7. Status of Labor
.t
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On May 2, 1933, all offices of all unions in Germany were
seized by Storm Troopers, their leaders and officers arrested, mal-
treated, or sent to concentration camps, and their property confiscated.
The autonomous organizations of German labor, built up over several
decades and enormously strengthened, particularly in fifteen years of
Republican regime, were destroyed in one day. They were inherited by the
German Labor Front which was no longer an organization of workers. It
was a section of the National Socialist Party, and included not only
workers and employees, but also all enterpreneours and professional men.
Apart from regulating wages and hours, the Labor Front
assumed duties with which former unions were never nor could have been
concerned. Social Honor Courts were set up to judge ’'gross violations of
social duties”. Employers, if found guilty of evading the above duties,
could heavily be fined or excluded from the management of their property.
On the other hand, employees could be prosecuted for agitation among
the workers which meant dismissal and subsequent starvation. Workers
could not leave their jobs without permission of the proper authorities
and if they did they were not permitted to find employment anywhere
else or seek relief. Every worker was supplied with a work book. A
black mark in the work book amounted to a death sentence which made it
ever so clear that the status of the individual employee under Nazi rule
virtually degenerated to serfdom. Labor was apportioned to industry in
the same way and on the same principle as raw materials, and the worker
could be ordered to any part of the country at any time. His family,
left behind, were taken care of at fixed low rates.
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8. Cartels,
No better insight into the German strategy of economic war
could be contrived than the history of Intereasen Gemeinschaft
Farbenindustrie Altiengesellschaft, commonly known as I, G. Farben,
The record of I, G. Farben in the twentieth century is a recital of
Germany’s attempt to use scientific achievements to become a major
world power, Y/hile I, G, Farben may have preferred to gain its own
ends and enchance the power and wealth of Germany by economic means,
it has consistently abetted and given force to military plans. This
huge combine was by all standards of measurement the largest corporation
in Europe, and one of the largest in the world ranking below only the
insurance and utility companies, and the colossal Standard Oil Company
of New Jersey. As an industrial and chemical combine, however, I. G.
Farben was among the handful of truly world-wide international industrial
concerns.
E. I. du Pont de Nemours & Co. is the oldest and largest of
the "Big Four" of the American chemical industry, and one of the staunchest
of the industrial baronies in this country. The armistice had hardly
been signed before Dupont representatives were on their way to visit
I. G. Farben for the purpose of forming an alliance, (l)
A tentative agreement was worked out for the organization of
a world company to exploit a process for synthetic ammonia. Dupont also
sought information and technical instruction in the dyestuffs industry.
Although I.G. Farben was not adverse to an agreement with Dupont, the two
could not reach complete accord on the relative division of control.
However, in 1926, it was revealed that Dupont had about three million
(1) Borkin, Joseph and Welsh, Charles A., "Germany's Master Plan",
Duell, Sloan and Pierce, New York, 1943, P. 88.
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dollars invested directly in I. G. Farben' s stock and with the
British Imperial Chemical Interests Ltd. owned minority interests in
I. G. Subsidiaries. (1)
On January 1, 1926, an agreement was reached between Dupont
Imperial Chemical Interests Ltd., and I. G. Farben which effectually
divided the world market for military power. This agreement discussed
in the hearing of the Nye Committee in 1934, was found in the Dupont
files marked "Unsigned - in effect as a gentlemens agreement". Under
this agreement patent licenses and technical information were exchanged,
and since, in deference to the Versailles Treaty, the German Companies
could not sell military explosives in other countries, Dupont became, in
effect, their sales agent. To quote the Nye Report, "In other words
though German munitions companies cannot sell abroad, American Companies
can sell for them, and to their own Government at that". (2)
Because of Dupont's position in our chemical industry in
particular, and our economy in general, it may seem quite astonishing and
unbelievable that such close ties existed between I. G. Farben and Dupont
even as late as 1939. However, the previous statements are a matter of
record and have not been denied by the Dupont organization.
The history of dyestuffs reveals the strategy and tactics
of German Geopolitik from the time Germany became a nation to the
present time. An indication of the significance of the dye industry was
the position of I. G. Farbenir.dustrie which translated literally means
"Dye Industry."
(1) Borkin, Joseph, and Y/elch, Charles A., "Germany’s Master Plan",
Duell, Sloan and Pearce, New York, 1943, F. 89.
(2) Ibid, P. 90
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Explosives, poison and noxious gasses, antitoxins and serums,
so essential to warfare belong to the same chemical category as do dye-
stuffs. The few basic coal, tar and organic compounds can be used to
make several hundred types of so-called "intermediates" which may in
turn be used with equal facility to make dyes, medioines or explosives.
Consequently, research in the dye industry has effects in all other
branches of the organic chemical industry. Out of the German dye
laboratories have come phosgene, among the deadliest of gases, as well
as salvarsan and sulphanilamide, the magic bullets used to destroy
diseases. The whole paradox of science is illustrated in these aspects
of the dyestuffs industry. Compounds almost identical in chemical
properties can be used to kill or cure, as weapons of man against man
or as man against the destructive forces of nature.
In reviewing the operation of the dye cartel up to the
outbreak of World War II, there were certain features which may be noted.
Without considering the relative positions of the principal members in-
cluding, I. G. Farben, Dupont, and the Imperial Chemical Interests of
Great Britain, it was apparent that the entire world, with the exception
of Russia, was organized in a more or less complete fashion. All of
Europe, all of North America, all of the major countries of South
America, and all of Asia were divided up among the principal dyestuffs
producers. Allocation of territory, interchange of patents and
technical information, fixing of production quotas and prices, and all
other behavior characteristics of international cartels were to be
found in the web of agreements and understandings. In the center of
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the web spinning out a filament in every direction could be found
I. G. Farben.
Germany’s metal reserves have always been scanty and in
her search for ’’ersatz” or substitute materials she, years ago, saw in
plastics the ideal material with which to round out the stock pile. The
appearance of plastics upon the industrial scene is relatively recent.
The industry in this country at present produces annually about 300,000,000
pounds of plastics valued at approximately $500,000,000. (1) Their uses
have not only been of a substitute variety, but because of their many
new characteristics, they have probably supplanted many uses of glass,
metals and wood permanently. Plastics are the genies of the test tube,
which are called up to remedy shortages.
There are many kinds of plastics, but Germany channelized
its science in the development of one of the most important, namely,
methyl methacrylate, which is better known in the United States under the
trade name of plexiglass or lucite. When the development of plexiglass
blossomed into commercial practicability in 1934, an agreement was
entered into between Rohm and Haas (Darmstadt) and Rohm and Haas (Phila-
delphia) both subsidiaries of I. G. Farben covering the field. The
Philadelphia firm was limited to the United States and Canada and
received the exclusive rights to patents in this territory. The right
to export elsewhere was prohibited. The German company, on the other
hand, retained rights to the rest of the world. The American company
even agreed to do whatever they could to prevent their customers from
(1) New York Times, October 8, 1945. P. 4
A»
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reselling into the territory of the German Company.
Friendly firms including General Aniline Works and Standard
I. G. Corporation were granted licenses to operate in these territories
upon agreeing that Rohm and Haas (Philadelphia) would "be the sole
supplier of raw materials in the basis of cost plus 10%.
Dupont also entered this German dominated cartel in 1936
and later Imperial Chemical Industries of Great Britain also entered into
an agreement with I. G. Farben and Dupont. This group was successful in
completely dominating the world plastics industry until the outbreak of
Yforld ’War II severed relations between the conspirators. (J)
Even in the drugs industry, I. G. Farben was dominant.
American branches of the Bayer Company were seized by the Alien Property
Custodian upon the entrance of the United States into ’World War I.
However, soon after the Bayer interests were purchased by the Sterling
products Company from the Alien Property Custodian, they were busy
entering into agreements with the German Bayer Company, a member of
I. G. Farben. While this 1920 agreement related basically to the
sale of aspirin in South America it broke the ground for future
dealings. In effect, the agreement provided that competition between
Eayer and Sterling in South America was to be eliminated, and it was
a forerunner of many future agreements which committed American drug
firms to a secondary role in a production dominated by I. G. Farben. (2)
The Aluminum Company of America, in the person of its created
partner, the Aluminum Company Ltd. of Canada, was a partner in a world
(1) Borkin, Joseph, and Welsh, Charles A., ’’Germany’ s Master Plan”,
Duell, Sloan and Pearce, New York, 1943, P. 120.
(2) Ibid, P. 138
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aluminum cartel to be later dominated by Germany. A Swiss Corporation
known as the "alliance” was formed at Easle, Switzerland, and issued
1,400 shares of "A" stock, subscribed by the members in the ratio of
one share of stock for each 100 metric tons of their respective annual
capacities. The entire world production was to be fixed by the Alliance
as well as fixing prices and restricting local production universally
throughout the world. The Aluminum Company of America although officially
not a member of the cartel did not disturb the cartels markets either
by accident or design and if it had the cartel never could have
functioned. Germany soon engineered a scheme within the cartel which
placed her as the number one world' s producer of aluminum. This
ascendency of Germany in aluminum was unimpaired and because of it
Germany's successes in the first years of World War II were assured, (l)
At the end of World War I, the demand for magnesium declined
as did the output, and as a result, the price fell to one-third of its
former level. Of the eight concerns in the United States which had
been engaged in the production of magnesium only two continued in the
industry. These were the Dow Chemical Company and the American
Magnesium Company, a wholly owned subsidiary of the Aluminum Company of
America. However, in 1927, the American Magnesium Company ceased pro-
duction and the Aluminum Company of America became Dow' s largest
customer and was granted preference as against all other customers of
Dow. In 1928, I. G. Farben approached Dow attempting to enter the
American market. Dow refused to go along and in 1931, I. G. Farben and
(l) Mendershavsen, Horst, "Economics of War", Prentice Hall Inc.,
New York, 1943, P. 53.
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the Aluminum Corporation of America formed a joint corporation known
as the Magnesium Development Company. Dow proceded to make a deal
with the Aluminum Corporation of America acting for the joint American-
German Corporation which insured Dow of its own monopoly in the pro-
duction of magnesium metal in the United States. It was agreed, however,
that magnesium was to be sold to I. G. Farben interests for
substantially less than the American market was paying. For example,
magnesium that sold in the American market for thirty cents a pound was
to be sold to I. G. Farben for twenty cents a pound or a discount of
33-l/3%. Germany’s magnesium production expanded as rapidly as
facilities could be increased and this again is an example of how
Germany created her war stock piles with the aid of American sponsored
cartels. (1)
Iron ore was one vital mineral that Germany lacked and for
which no adequate substitute could be provided. Germany depended upon
foreign supply for more than two thirds of her consumption. Sweden was
the largest supplier providing about 60 percent of Germany’ s import of
ore. Vast stock piles were created and the firm of Krupp became Germany's
largest consumer of iron ore. As the foremost German producer of steel
and steel products, and as member of several international cartels,
Krupp continued to expand and reach out into different branches of
metallurgy. Eventually German steel production, which rose from year
to year, far outstripped the other nations of Europe who had in 1926
formed a steel cartel. This also included England, whose steel makers
(l) Borkin, Joseph, and Welsh, Charles A., "Germany’s Master Plan",
Duell, Sloan and Pearce, New York, 1943, P. 230.
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continued to observe the limits set forth in the various agreements.
Standard Oil Company of New Jersey and I. G. Farben in
1927 made a series of agreements in which the two colossal world
operators agreed to eliminate competition between themselves. This was
done by recognizing the position of Standard Oil in the oil industry and
the position of I. G. Farben in the chemical industry. Standard Oil re-
ceived carte blanche in the oil industry of the world with the exception
of the domestic German Market, I. G. Farben, in turn, was assured a free
hand in the entire chemical industry of the world including the United
States, a differential that was to embarrass Standard Oil at a later date. (1)
The patents of I. G. Farben and Standard Oil were pooled
so that Standard Oil received not only the benefits of its own research
in oil technology, but also received the benefit of any discoveries made by
I. G. Farben. It was intended that this patent consolidation would so
fortify Standard Oil that other oil refiners would be reduced to a
subordinate position, thus rendering them susceptible to the formation of
a gigantic patent pool covering the entire oil industry. (2)
The Standard—I. G. cartel was in its scope and implications
larger, more powerful and in some respects of greater significance than
any other international economic agreement that has been discussed.
This structure was a mighty fortress built to withstand any as suit by
the forces of competition on the territory of Standard Oil or I. G.
Farben, and a safe base from which sorties into other industries could
be initiated.
(1) Borkin, Joseph and Welsh, Charles A., "Germany’s Master Plan",
Duell, Sloan and Pearce, New York, 1943, P. 80.
(2) Ibid, P. 185
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CHAPTER V
WORLD WAR II
A . German Position Immediately Prior to Outbreak of War .
By the end of 1938, Germany had reached the crucial point of
her economic expansion -- the point where the last reserves in man
power, material, and productive capacity had been utilized in the
service of the most ambitious power politics ever adopted by any
government in modern times. Germany had gradually an economic system
that could have been maintained indefinitely without financial collapse
providing the government did not venture to far astray and the people
continued to endure complete deprivation of industrial liberties.
The survival of the German system offered no insuperable financial
problem. A government that completely controls (by a most comprehensive
terror system) foreign trade, domestic consumption, cost of production
and domestic investments is always able to procure the financial means
for its purposes. And it is of secondary importance whether these
means are raised by taxation, short-term or long-term borrowing, or
even by printing paper money. The danger points arise if and when a
government undertakes to push expansion beyond the natural limits of
available resources.
This danger point had already been reached at the end of 1938 in
Germany, and for this reason. Dr. lijalmar Schacht resigned from the
Reisch bank. (1) Labor had been exploited beyond all limits and
efficiency was decreasing. For this reason, coal production had begun
to decline because production per man and shift was falling off. For
(1) Stolper, Gustave, ’’German Economy”, Reynal and Hitchcock,
New York, 1940, P. 272.
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the same reason, the quality of production had begun to deteriorate
and the war-bent German nation even before the war was officially
declared as showing signs of the uttermost strain. (1)
B . Great Britain and France Declare War .
1. Immediate Cause.
Hitler’s decision to invade Poland brought down upon
his head the declaration of war against the invader by Great Britain
and France on that historic day, September 3, 1939. Whether Hitler
believed that after Great Britain’s capitulation at Munich and
desertion of the Czechs, she would fail to declare war unless more
fully prepared to, is still open to argument. However, the fact remains
that German hordes did invade Poland and everlastingly to her credit
Great Britain was faced with the task of combating one of the most
powerful war machines of all time. France, however, at the time was
supposed to possess a powerful well-drilled army and the vaunted
Maginot Line, but whether British intelligence had a true picture of
French corruption and inefficiency, has never been disclosed.
\
2. Economic position of opponents.
From the point of view of natural resources and basic
industrial capacity, Germany and her allies began Vforld War II in an
inferior position. There were no materials that the British and
French empires could not have produced in better quality and greater
volume. The devastating failure of these empires consisted in mis-
judging the security of their position and in neglecting the timely
mobilization of their huge resources. As a result in the first years
of the war, the Axis powers were able to win great military victories
(1) Stolper, Gustave, "German Economy", Reynal and Hitchcock,
New York, 1940, P. 273.
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and to wrest important resources from their opponents. Their Armies
produced iron ore, bauxite, coal, oil and foodstuffs. They gained most
of the world’s current supply of rubber and tin. And yet, in the middle
of 1942, the United Nations still commanded superior resources in
almost all essential fields. They could draw on an oil supply more
than ten times as large as that of the Axis, on sixty times the cotton,
six times the copper, and twice the coal and steel. (1) The United
Nations had a tremendous advantage in the armament races entered upon
by the belligerents and quasi-belligerents. They started with huge
unused reserves and could save all the billions Germany spent on
plants for the production of expensive substitute materials by being
able to buy cheap natural materials.
3. British responsibility.
Outside of those special groups who have some particular
racial, religious or party hatred of the Nazis, the most fanatical
German-hater now at large is Lord Robert Vansittart who served as
permanent Head of the British Foreign Office under the Conservative or
Tory Government for a considerable period of time prior to the out-
break of the war. It is a matter of historical record that the policy
of the above Governments was to encourage and strengthen Hitler and
make him feel certain of a British benevolent neutrality as long as
he confined his series of invasions to the east. Vansittart was the
man who guided the Tory foreign policy which went under the popular
name of "Appeasement”, but really was one of collaboration with the
(1) Mendershausen, Horst, "Economics of War", Prentice-Hall Inc,,
New York, 1943, Page 53.
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Nazis in rearming Germany and developing an aggressive policy in Eastern
Europe. He have been accustomed to saddle responsibility for this upon
the Baldwin and Chamberlain Governments, upon their Foreign Ministers,
and outside the Government upon the so-called Clivedon Set, which met at
Lady Astor's estate. (1)
Perhaps the best brief presentation of Vansittart'
s
foreign policies in the critical ’30s is that contributed to "The Nation"
back in October 1937, by the veteran, brilliant and extremely well-
informed foreign correspondent of the Manchester Guardian, Robert Dell.
Says Dell of the general control and over-all direction of British
foreign policy during the '30s:
"Ever since Vansittart became permanent Head of the British
Foreign Office, he has made British foreign policy, whether the
marionette of the movement was called Simon, Hoare, or Eden."
According to Mr. Dell, Vansittart' s ominous foreign
policy was based on the following leading objectives:
1. Absolutely to keep England out of war unless the most
vital interests of the British Empire are involved.
2. To maintain the indispensable alliance with France as a
protection against possible German aggression, while ruthlessly sub-
ordinating the national interests of France to British foreign policy.
3. To be on the best of terms with Hitlerite Germany,
to encourage German ambitions in eastern Europe, and to use this
German expansion in eastern Europe as a means of keeping Hitler from
demanding a return of the German colonies.
(1) Barnes, Harry E., "Britain's Top War Criminal", the Progressive,
Volume IX, Number 37, P. 8.
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4. To obstruct, if possible, a German-Italian alliance.
5. To detach France from her Eastern European alliances and
obligations so that the German expansion in the East, which Yansittart
fostered, would not involve France and Britain in war.
It was this policy of Vansittart which led England to
acquiesce in, and then encourage, German rearmament, to come to a naval
agreement with Germany, to consent to German reoccupation of the Rhine-
land, to refuse to call Mussolini’s bluff relative to the invasion of
Ethiopia, and to favor German aggression in Eastern Europe from 1937
to 1939. Germany was encouraged to seek dominion on the Continent, in
order to lessen the demand of German colonists for the restoration of
the German colonial empire and to check the reassertion of German
ambitions for expansion overseas—a type of expansion which would
directly menace the British Empire.
This unfortunate policy brought Hitler and his Germany
out of weakness, obscurity and penury. It started Nazi Germany on the
road to rearmament, occupation of the Rhineland, annexation of Austria,
partition of Czechoslovakia, and the demands on Poland which led to
the outbreak of the second World War.
4. Fall of France.
An almost fatal blow was struck at the Allied cause when
the high-geared and mobile German Eehrmacht swept across the French
borders, swung around and flanked the heretofore considered impregnable
Marginot Line and disastrously defeated French forces on French soil.
The Frency Army which had been previously considered by Great Britain
and the United States to be a well officered and well-disciplined fight-
ing force, was in reality disclosed to be a leaderless uniformed mob
torn with political corruption and gross inefficienc;/. Equipment which
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on paper appeared to be the best and most up to date obtainable in
reality did not put in an appearance. Behind this unfortunate Army,
stood a government also torn by dissension and corruption and led by
party politicians who were wholly unequal to emergency war leadership.
Charges and countercharges have been issued where the Army accused the
government of selling them out and vice versa. However, France’s
defeat proved she, as a nation, had been deteriorating into a corrupt
and self-satisfied country, since the year 1930. Lacking strong and
potent leadership to arrest this condition, France proved to be an easy
victim of the German military might such to the discomfort of a startled
Great Britain and an awakened United States.
C. Russo-German Situation .
1. Non-Aggression pact and division of Poland.
Russia and Germany although utterly incompatible insofar
as political philosophies are concerned and natural enemies entered into
a non-agression pact because at that time it was expedient for each to
do so. Hitler’s rise to power was attributed to his anti-communist stand
and Russian leaders held no illusions as to “where Hitler’s eventual con-
quests would lead. However, after Hitler’s conquest of Poland, Russia
greedily took over the two-thirds of the country nearest her borders
demanded as a price from Hitler for non-intervention.
2. Natural enemies.
Germany’s blueprint for conquest was truly global and
included the vast reaches of Asia and the riches of the Indies. To
deprive its enemies of this wealth and to encircle Russia, were the
objectives of Germany' s eastern strategy.
In the ancient rivalry of peoples, no quarrel has burned
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more steadily than the antagonism between the Teuton and the Slav. From
Adolf of Holstein, the leader of the Teutonic Knights in the twelfth
century, to Adolph Hitler, the concept recurring over and over again in
German dreams is the Drang Nach Osten--the drive to the East. (1)
The land ocean of Russia had surged across the path to
German world dominion. To the West lay Britain--the gateway to the
seas. To the North were the silent waters of ice. The Russian land
bridge to the East was, therefore, the path across which German armies
were to trod. The fertile valley of the Ukraine would supply the food
for the Wehrmacht on the march and what was more important, beyond the
bridge of Russia was the fabulous wealth of Asia. All the ersatz
materials which Germany so painfully contrived in its laboratories
existed in natural abundance beyond the Caucasus and in the Indies were
endless deposits of oil. The virgin resources of Asia beckoned and
only the Russian Bear stood guard. (2)
3. Germany Decides to Invade.
Adolph Hitler was sold upon the invading of Russia
despite the warnings of the General Staff that a Russian campaign,
although inevitable, could not be undertaken while Great Britain remained
unconquered. German intelligence reports, however, indicated that Russia
was wide awake and mobilizing rapidly. Hitler argued that if Germany
did not assume the initiative and invade right away, Russia would be far
better prepared and might assume the initiative herself. The will of
Hitler prevailed despite the objections of the General Staff and the
(1) Borkin, Charles, "Germany’s Master Plan”, Sloan and Pearce,
New York, 1943, P. 158.
(2) Borkin, Charles, "Germany’s Master Plan”, Duell, Sloan and Pearce,
New York, 1943, P. 158.
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German Legions emulating the earlier operations of Napoleon's Armies
stormed through Yfestern Russia pursuing retreating Red Forces to the
very citadel of Russian Communism. A combination of a brave Russian
stand, superior manpower, sagging supply lines, adverse weather conditions,
and United States lend lease equipment brought about the disastrous
German retreat which ended in her inglorious defeat on the Eastern Front.
D. Pearl Harbor Attack Seals Doom of Germany .
Japan, the counterpart of the Axis in the East, was regarded by
Germany as an ally, not by choice, but by necessity. The Germans
distrusted the Japanese and, no doubt, the feeling was mutual. The two
countries, although Japan had conquered stock piles of critical materials
that Germany needed, and required herself German industrial aid, were in
no geographical position to coordinate their activities. The British
and unofficial American Navies roamed the seas practically unchallenged
which made it impossible for the Germans and the Japanese to exchange
assets and coordinate activities.
Hitler desired to maneuver Japan inti a position where she would
declare war on Russia, therefore, causing Russia to fight a two-front
war. The wily Japanese, however, were not interested in such plans, and
continued to remain at peace with Russia thereby contributed largely to
Germany's defeat on the Eastern Front.
1. Efforts of Germany to Keep United States Out of Yfar.
Hitler and his advisors had no illusions as to what
the entrance of the United States into the war would mean. Germany
leaned over backwards desperately trying to keep the United States out
even though this nation was partaking for all intents and purposes, in
an undeclared war against the Axis. America was the arsenal of
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democracy supplying munitions and supplies to Great Britain and Russia.
American merchant vessels convoyed by American naval sea and aircraft
took possession of the North Atlantic, carrying lend lease supplies to
Europe. These activities termed "acts short of war" by the late
President Roosevelt, were technically war-like acts which ordinarily
would call for strong protests from the offended power. However,
Germany not desiring to give the United States an excuse to enter the
conflict on a full-fledged basis chose in most cases, to ignore these
belligerent acts. The Germans realized that wealthy America, the most
highly industrialized nation in the history of the world, and in
possession of raw materials, foodstuffs and labor in huge quantities,
would seal Germany’s doom if she v/ere to be brought into the conflict.
Then on that tragic day in December, 1941, the treacherous
Japanese struck at Pearl Harbor, the blow that brought the full
industrial and military might of the United States into the conflict.
Insofar as it has been able to determine, Nazi Germany was as fully
stunned as the United States after the attack took place, and the German
Government then realized that Japan had plunged them into war with the
United States. Many of the wiser heads in Germany realized at that
time that Germany’s days of conquest were numbered for the vast
industrial and military potential of the United States was a giant slow
to rise from his long slumber, but once aroused, would become an unbeatable
foe.
E. Causes of German Defeat .
1. Air Superiority.
Germany, after losing air superiority in early 1943, soon
-.
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found themselves being punished in an ever increasing tempo by Allied
aircraft having a field day over Nazi territory. In late 1944 and
early 1945, vast fleets of United States’ bombers and fighters roamed
almost at will, bombing industry and transport, and shooting up trains
and trucks. Thousands of British bombers nightly blastered wide areas
of German Territory, (l)
2. Manpower.
In addition to the great air offensive. United States and
British Forces on the Western Front forced a demoralized and outnumbered,
but still bitterly resisting German Army into the Northern Reich. On
the Eastern Front, vast Russian Forces pushed across the Oder River
and these two great drives added up to a knock out for the Germans crushed
between the twin drive pincers. The Ruhr, centered of the Nazi
industry, was invaded and captured, and coupled with previous loss of
vital industries in Silesia proved to be a major crippling blow. (2)
3* Material.
Germany had lost the sources of raw materials that were
the backbone of her power to wage war. That loss was a part of the
price that Germany had to pay for defeats in Silesia, Poland, East
Prussia and Pomerania, for earlier defeats in France, the Ukraine and
the Balkans, and for bombings resulting from defeat in the air. Mining
capacity was cut from 550,000,000 tons to 400,000,000 tons in 1944 and
the movement of available coal was hampered by bombed out railroad systems.
Germany became short of coal for running railroads, making electricity,
(1) United States News, ’’Air Pavers Decisive Test”, Volume XVIII,
Number 10, March 9, 1945, P. 11.
(2) United States News, "Allies Final Drive", Volume XVIII,
Number 11, March 16, 1945. P. 11.
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and for the conversion to synthetic gasolene, synthetic rubber and
chemicals. The annual rate of oil output in late 1944 and early 1945
was cut from 16,000,000 tons to 3,500,000 tons. All of her refineries
were captured or bombed out of commission and only three or four synthetic
plants were working. Thousands of German tanks, trucks and other
vehicles were stranded for lack of fuel. In one day near Glogau, the
Russians captured 345 planes, most of them out of gas. (1) Steel pro-
duction declined from 36,000,000 tons to 12,000,000 tons in February 1945.
Lack of steel meant lack of tanks, guns, and every other type of weapon
in addition to inadequate trucks and railroad rolling stock to rush
reinforcements and supplies to the front. Germany also lost one-fourth
of her lead, half of her copper and zinc, two-thirds of her manganese,
three-fourths of her aluminum, four fifths of her tungsten and nickle,
and nine-tenths of her chrome. Thus, the general offensive of the
Allies, once it was in full swing, found Germany short of supplies that
were vital to her continued resistance. (2)
F. Cost of the War Years in Lives and Dollars to the United States .
The total United States casualties in 'World Vfar II, although
much less than had been anticipated, cost almost three hundred thousand
lives as compared to fifty three thousand lives in World War I. In
the German war alone. Army losses in dead and missing passed 175,000.
Navy losses, not broken down by theaters, were relatively small. (3)
War against Japan cost 54,000 Army casualties and 63,471 Naval
casualties. (4)
(1) United States News, ,fWhy Germany Can’t Last", Volume XVIII,
Number 9, March 2, 1945, P. 28.
(2) United States News, "Why Germany Can’t Last", Volume XVIII,
Number 9, March 2, 1945, P. 29.
(#) United States News, "The Price Paid by United States,", Volume XIX,
Number 8, August 24, 1945, P. 48.
(4) Ibid, Page 49.
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Losses in American lives in these two wars, were the greatest
in the nation's history, yet as stated above were far less than
anticipated. At one time there was expectation that 1,000,000 United
States lives might have to be spent to force a surrender in Japan
through invasion. Bombing, however, removed that necessity.
In dollars. World War II will have cost $336,000,000,000 when the
direct war cost bills are all paid. That is eleven times the cost of
the first Tiorld War. To break these figures down still further, the
war in Europe was estimated to have cost $200,000,000,000 and dollar
costs of defeating the Japanese are put at about $136,000,000,000.
The cost in dollars is not everything that is evidenced by a dollar
sign in that the vast coal, iron ore, oil, copper, lead, zinc and
lumber resources the United States possesses were exploited for war
purposes and never can be replaced. (1)
(l) United States News, "Cost of the War to Taxpayers",
Volume XIX, Number 3, July 20, 1945, Page 32.
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CHAPTER VI
i
ALLIED OCCUPATION AND THE PEACE
A. Four Power Occupation ,
In February 1945, on the eve of the German collapse, the
Allies met at Yalta and at this conference the division of Germany was
proposed. It was planned that the forces of the United States, Russia,
Great Britain, and France each occupy a separate zone. But since it
was clearly impossible for the Allies to rule Germany without some
kind of an Allied Control Commission consisting of the Supreme Commanders
of the four occupying powers with headquarters in Berlin. For this
quadriparte system of occupation, no precedent existed. Not only has
no country of Germany's size and potential economic and political
power been placed under direct rule by foreign occupation forces for
a long period of time, but no conquered nation has ever been ruled as
a condominium by four powers. Differences in language, as well as the
diversity of political and economic concepts existing among the Allies,
have made the operation of a more highly integrated system of Allied
military government extremely difficult. But the single most important
factor responsible for the adoption of the zonal plan of occupation was
Russia's fears and suspicions that the Western powers might support Anti-
Soviet groups in eastern Germany if British and American forces were
permitted to enter that section of the country. (1) Under these conditions,
(l) Hadsel, Winifred N., "Foreign Policy Reports" Volume XXI,
Number 16, P. 224.
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any alternative to the Yalta plan for partition of Germany probably
was impossible. But since the United States and Britain have frequently
deprecated all steps that strengthen the trend toward a divided
Europe, the two Yfestern powers might well have expressed their convictions
on this point by making a stronger attempt to secure a unified Allied
administration of Germany.
1. Allied Control Council.
The Allied Control Council was set up by the victorious
nations to rule Germany as a unit from its headquarters in Berlin, How-
ever, from the outset this body has been torn by dissension and internal
rivalries and has had a difficult time making up its mind on the
simplest of issues, (l) In practice Germany is now partitioned into
four segements outlined for the purposes of military occupation. Between
these military zones there are distinct frontiers which are incompatible
with the agreed policy of securing uniformity of treatment of the civilian
population throughout Germany. French opposition to certain provisions
of the Potsdam Pact has constantly deadlocked the Council and a compromise
settlement on the questions of the Rhineland and the Ruhr that will
satisfy the French desire for security has not been yet effected. The
Allies might well re-examine the provision for unanimous decisions by
the Allied Control Council in favor of majority rule. A divided Germany
should be avoided at all costs, since it would definitely encourage the
further division of Europe, and endanger the alliance that won the war,
(l) United States News, "Growing Stresses in Germany", Volume XIX,
Number 9, August 31, 1945, P. 19.
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which remains the only hope for establishing a framework for keeping
the peace.
2. Russian Zone.
The Russian zone contains the area known as the "bread
basket" of Germany and includes the cities of Berlin, Leipzig and
Dresden. Eastern Germany and lower East Prussia formerly were also
included as the principal suppliers of foodstuffs for industrial
Germany. These areas are a part of the new Poland which is a puppet
state dominated by Russia. Food surpluses in these areas were sent
eastward rather than westward which added to chaotic conditions of the
starving Germans residing in Central and Western Germany. It is quite
apparent that the Potsdam provision that Germany "be treated as a
single economic unit", did not apply in these areas. (1) It is
also well to note that Russian troops live off the land and receive
no supplies of foodstuffs from their own country. Much of this area
was also highly industrialized, but if recent press reports are
to be regarded as authentic, most of the desirable plants and
equipment have been dismantled and transported to Western Russia.
3. French Zone.
The French zone is unimportant industrially except for
the Saar, which is being worked for the aid of France rather than Germany,
and all surplus food in this zone was exported to France. The French
have been a constant source of difficulty in the Allied Control Council,
(1) United States News, "Growing Stresses in Germany", Volume XIX,
Number 9, August 31, 1945.
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and although labeled as obstructionists by both the United States and
Great Britain, have continued to demand the dismemberment of Germany by
internationalization of the industrial Ruhr. This discord among the
members of the Allied Control Council of which France has been a
persistent offender has seriously hampered the occupational operation
of Germany. (l) It has been suggested that a contributory cause to this
chaotic condition are the rules set forth in the Potsdam Agreement which
require unanimity of the four powers on all Allied Control Council
decisions. (2)
4. British Zone.
The British occupy the northwestern portion of Germany
which is densely populated and highly industrialized. It includes the
ports of Hamburg and Kiel and the inland cities of Cologne, Dusseldorf,
A
Essen, Bremen and Hanover. The population of this zone is mostly
industrial workers, miners, and tradesmen, but little land is available
for them to turn to food production. It is not possible to employ this
population because industrial equipment that could give employment has
been sent to Russia as reparations and miners are refusing to perform
their duties unless food is forthcoming. They cannot be induced to
work for increased wages and the British authorities fully realize that
miners must have a diet of greater than 1300 calories a day in order to produce
in any quantity. Special rations of food have been issued to miners by the
(1) These subjects will be discussed in greater detail under the sections,
"Potsdam Agreement" and "French Version".
(2) United States Hews, "Discord of Allies on German Rule", Volume XIX,
Humber 26, December 14, 1945, P. 35.
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British who imported it from their fast dwindling stores in Britain, (l)
5. U. S. Zone
South central Germany except for a small area nearest to
the French border is occupied by the United States. The zone includes
1
all of Bavaria and the cities of Munich, Nuremberg, Stuttgart and
Mannheim. Originally this area was almost self sufficient and its small
Bavarian farms aided in feeding the rest of Germany. However, at the
present time farms are overcrowded and there is little surplus arable
land available to settle the 2,000,000 or more Germans who fled the
Russian zone or were deported from Czechoslovakia, Poland and Hungry.
Industrially this area is not of great importance and the war plants
built by the Naxis in 1940 and 1941 have been for the most part
destroyed by Allied bombing.
6. Danish Activity.
In contrast to above policy, Denmark adopted a sensible
and humane attitude tward German refugees from Polish and Russian
zones. Military barracks originally built by the occupying Germans
were used to house the refugees who were first ordered to submit to
hot baths and numerous "shots'’ before being allowed to take up
occupancy. The occupants soon were busily engaged painting and other-
wise making livable their temporary quarters. Most of these persons
were women, children and older persons, and the Danish government is
making a concerted effort to reunite the families separated in the
last days of the war. These refugees are going to be provided with
(l) United States News, "Hazards for Four Zone Control", Volume XIX,
Number 27, December 21, 1945, P. 19.
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seed and garden equipment which will allow them to raise their own food-
stuffs and other skilled tradesmen are being utilized in re-establishing
the few Danish industries in existance prior to the war. (l) The Danes
feel that despite previous German occupation, a harsh policy towards
Germans will only bring about an insuperable desire for revenge re-
sulting in another war. (2)
7. Czechs in Sudentenland.
The activities of the Czechs in the Sudentenland had been
little publicized in the United States press, but investigation has
disclosed that the infamous policy of the victors has resulted in the
deaths of thousands of Germans and Sudenten Czechs. Survivors of the
innumerable "death marches" have straggled, into the Russian and U.S.
zones in a pitiful and starving condition. Tales of wholesale uprooting
of Sudeten Germans and Czechs from ancestral farms and homes that have
been occupied for generations have been transmitted to Allied intelligence
agencies. These people, old and young, were driven from their homes and
ordered to wander the winter roads with only what they could carry in
their hands. The old soon perished by the side of the road and a small
minority of survivors from time to time drifted into Berlin and other
cities. The Czechs executed a ruthless and criminal policy of expelling
everyone of German blood with the exception of a few highly skilled
tradesmen from her borders, and the caring for of these survivors had
been assumed by the Allied Control Council. (3)
(1) Chamberlain, William H., "Common Sense About the Peace", the Pro-
gressive, Volume 9, Number 141, P. 2.
(2) For further discussion refer to heading "Hard vs. Soft Peace".
(3) Chamberlain, William H., "The Crimes of the Peace", The Progressive,
Volume 10, Number 10, March 11, 1S46, P. 1.
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B . Allied Administrative Policy .
For the second time in thirty years, the United States, Russia,
Britain and France have "beaten Germany in war. The responsibilities
of the winning powers are to teach the ways of peace to the 66,000,000
Germans who are at their mercy, and to rebuild a Europe that has been
seared by war throughout almost its entire length and breadth.
The victory, documented by formal signing of unconditional
surrender terms, put into Allied hands the whole chaotic mass that was
the Reich. The Allies got the soldiers and sailors, the trucks, tanks,
and guns of the Army, the ships and submarines of the Navy. They have
the industries, arms plants, textile mills, coal mines railroads down
to the last battered boxcar, and farms down to the last stray cot.
Now that the Allies rule Germany, they-must devise a peace
settlement for the country that all of them will be willing and able to
enforce over a long period of time. Although precise decisions con-
cerning Germany* s new frontiers and future economic and political regine
all call for careful consideration, these are matters of secondary im-
portance compared to the need for united Allied support of whatever
settlement is adopted. However, at the present time, we find a bitter
rivalry between Russia, on the one hand, and the 7/estern powers, on the
other, for the control of Germany. This highly dangerous situation is
causing the Allies to face the Germans as a divided group torn by dissention
and unable to coordinate their German policies.
1. Military Rule.
The military governments in the four zones have adopted
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rival policies toward Germany because each one of the Big Four had its
own particular national interests in Germany. Russia whose western
territories have been devastated by the Nazis, is primarily concerned
with the rapid reconstruction of these areas and knows this can be
best accomplished by securing German industrial plants as reparations.
The French, like the Russians, are also interested in obtaining German
equipment as restitution for the destruction and looting the Germans
carried out in France. From a long-range point of view, both the
Russians and French are determined that Germany shall be so greatly
weakened as to be unable to undertake future wars against them. In
addition, Moscow wishes to make certain that Germany will be incapable
of adding any considerable strength to the western bloc the Russians
continue to fear may be erected.
To the British, on the other hand, a weakened Germany
does not appear an unmixed blessing. Since Britain’s major post-war need
will be markets, there has been a tendency on the part of many Britishers,
in both official and unofficial circles, to insist that no punitive
measures be taken against Germany that would permanently prevent it
from purchasing goods abroad. Faced by growing competition from the
greatly expanding industries of the United States, Britain has become
increasingly concerned about the German market, and the possible effects
of Germany’s collapse on the economy of western Europe. The stake of
the United States in the future of Germany is less specific than that
of the Russians, French and British, for the American post-war economy
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is not largely dependent for its prosperity either on reparations in
kind or exports to the Reich. Nevertheless, any consideration of
American security reveals the basic interest of the United States is
preventing Germany from going to war again, either alone or in combination
with one of the great powers, since such a war would undoubtedly involve
this country even more quickly and completely than did the last two
world wars, (l)
President Roosevelt by-passed the State and War Depart-
ments in 1944 and requested the Secretary of the Treasury to draw up
a plan for the disposal of Germany. (2) This "hard" plan expressed the
conviction that Germany’s key industries should be removed or destroyed
lest American tendencies toward a lenient peace permit the Germans to
regain their strength. (3) Almost immediately criticism developed
within the Roosevelt administration of the "hard" policy towards Germany.
On the one hand, a modified version of the Morgenthau proposals became
the basis of the military directive the Joints Chiefs of Staff prepared
for the guidance of General Eisenhower on occupation of German
territories. ( 4 ) But while these "hard" terms were adopted by American
military officials, the State Department and the Foreign Economic
(1) For an analysis of the policies, the Allies are pursuing in Germany,
see series of articles from Berlin and Paris by Vim Dean, "Foreign
Policy Bulletin", November 2, 9, 19, 1945.
(2) For further details refer to heading entitled, "Morganthau Plan".
(3) Morgenthau, Henry Jr., "Germany is our Problem", Harper, New York,
1945, P. 1-4.
(4) This directive was sent to General Eisenhower in April 1945, but
kept secret until its text was released by Secretary of State Byrnes
on October 17, 1945, New York Times, October 18, 1945.
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Administration insisted that these measures were unworkable. This
indecision in Washington as to whether a "hard" or ’’soft” policy should
be followed in Germany was one important factor in hindering the forma-
tion of a united Allied program for occupation of the Reich.
In February 1945 at Yalta, the Big Three declared in the
official communique that "The goal of the United Nations is to destroy
German militarism and Nazism thus assuring that Germany will never again
be able to disturb the peace of the world". To implement this plan, the
"Big Three" declared their intention to break up the General Staff;
remove or destroy all German military equipment; eliminate or control all
German industry that could be used for military production; bring all war
criminals to just and swift punishment and exact reparations in kind
for the destruction wrought by the Germans. So far as German territories
were concerned, the communique hinted that the Reich would be considerably
reduced. These punitive measures set forth by the Allies were somewhat
offset, however, by the rather vague statement that "it is not our purpose
to destroy the people of Germany, but only when Nazism and Militarism
have been destroyed will there be hope for a decent life for Germans,
and a place for them in the comity of nations". (1)
2. Contrast in Policies- -Germany and Japan.
Recently the Marshall Field newspapers, which had been
early adherents to the Morgenthau doctrine of a "hard" peace published
a series of articles by Ed Johnson, their foreign correspondent in
Germany, on "Four Power Occupation".
(1) Department of State Bulletin, "The Crimea Conference", Volume XIII,
Number 286, P. 448,
*.
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"The American Soldiers who are occupying and governing the
U.S. zones in Germany believe overwhelmingly we are making a failure
out of the job;" said Johnson.
"The great majority ?/ant to pull out and go home- -the sooner
the better. They are sick of Germany, sick of the Army. And they are
disgusted by the failures of the four military governments."
Taking stock of our nine months achievement in Germany,
Johnson reports:
1. "We have failed to gain the respect of German adults, either
for the United States or for the ideals we represent."
2. "We have failed to start a comprehensive program of re-
educating children in democratic, Anti-Nazi, and Anti-Militarist ways."
3. "We have failed to reward adequately the few Germans who
earned the right to our consideration by opposing Hitlerism or to care
for the many who suffered from Hitlerism."
4. "We have failed to tell either the Germans of our own
fellows what king of a Germany we want them to rebuild."
Johnson asserted that "economically too the Allied system
of four zone control--if it can be called a system- -has produced an
’absurd 1 situation. The economic planning of the country’s future has
been dictated according to the beliefs and peculiarities of the
occupying country of the particular zone. Each of the four zones is
being constructed--insofar as one can use this idealist form—in
autharchic isolation."
Compare this with what has happened in Japan under the
unified Allied Administration of General MacArthur. Y/hile Japanese war
criminals, militarists, and economic dynasties are being systematically
• -
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removed from seats of power, the rest of the people of Japan are being
given every opportunity to build the first foundations of a democratic
society.
With no inter-zone wrangling or economic compartmentalization
to impede progress, the Allied command has taken decisive steps to
democratize the schools, the press, the radio, the movies, and the
political life of Japan. The interlocking directorate of imperialists,
militarists, and monopolists that has ruled Japan with an iron hand has
been smashed. The great financial and industrial families--the Zaibatsu--
have been handed their death sentence as economic overlords, (l)
In a significant statement ordering the break up of Japan’s
ruling families and cartel system. General MacArthur set basic Allied
policy by decreeing that all combines must be smashed so as to permit
’’wider distribution of income and ovmership of the means of production
and trade in Japan and to aid the Japanese economic development along
peaceful, democratic lines."
This is the pattern of our policy in Japan. It is to be
admitted that imperial japan has not been converted to a democratic,
peace-loving nation overnight, but it has launched us--and the
Japanese--along a course that holds incalculable hope for the future.
Allied policy in Japan has been the reverse--in terms of
administration and in terms of basic philosophy—of Allied policy in
Germany. And naturally enought, it is producing the opposite result of
what is happening in Germany, as reported by General Eisenhower, the
(l) Rubin, Maurice, "Germany and Japan", the Progressive, Volume 10,
Number 2, January 14, 1946, P. 6.
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G. I.'s and the press* (l)
3. Suffering and Mistreatment of German Civilian Population.
Conditions have become so intolerable in occupied Germany
that many members of the British Parliament and a number of leading
English journals are demanding the immediate review of the entire mess
with a view to make a fresh start along saner, more hopeful, and more
democratic lines.
Norman Clark, Berlin correspondent of the London News-
Chronicle, reported an item which was widely suppressed in the American
press:
"Faced with the prospect of a disaster overwhelming a whole
nation, the Allied public health authorities are ordering burgomasters
to take measures ensuring the easy burial of the dead in the Winter.
Graces are to be dug in November by men who in later monuhs will be
debilitated by weeks of undernourishment and will not have strength to
dig at that time."
Commenting on this report, the London Tribune, left-wing
weekly of Aneurin Bevan, made this comment:
"Imagine for a moment that this report had appeared not in a
British paper in November, 1945, but in a Nazi paper some time before the
Battle of Stalingrad, imagine that the town from which it was written
was not Berlin, but Warsaw or Kharkou or Amsterdam.
"A wave of horror would have swept the free world; no words
would have been strong enough to denounce the barbarity unveiled by
this report. Yet what is happening now, after the defeat of Nazi
(l) See section entitled "Eisenhower Report".
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Germany is nothing less than the transformation of a large part of the
country into one huge Belsen. We are as efficient, it appears, as the
Nazis were—ordering the men to dig their own graves, before their
energy is sapped by hunger, cold and disease", (l)
But there is much more to the grim picture. The London
Tribune sifts through countless reports from correspondents, officials,
and soldiers to report that, "In the Eastern part of Germany, the
activities of the Russian Army of occupation have rendered eventual
reconstruction, on however modest a scale, impossible. In Berlin, and
in other places, almost every piece of machinery, office furniture, and
equipment of any description including bicycles, bedding, telephones,
watdhes, and practically every vehicle that can be got hold of is going
East. This means that the local population is left practically without
food and without tools, or other means of repairing their houses, roads
and sewers. They are unable to produce even the most primitive
necessities of life." (2)
The London Tribune further reports that "In violation of
the ^otsdam Agreement, the wholesale expulsion of all Germans from the
Polish-occupied areas east of the rivers Oder and Neisse and from the
Sudetenland in Czechoslovakia is bringing a stream of utterly destitute
refugees into the Berlin area. There is no food, shelter, clothing or
medical attention for them there, so they are driven out to die on the
roads or starve in camps, just as the Nazis’ victims were left to starve
in Belsen. And this is not a handful of people: some eight or nine
(1) London Tribune, November 14, 1945, P. 3.
(2) London Tribune, December 7, 1945, P. 18.
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million human beings are effected among them staunch Anti-Nazis." (l)
Dorothy Thompson in her syndicated column related the
following information: "In the Russian zone, which together with the
Polish, comprises half of Germany, 50 percent of the crop is lost. The
stripping of industries in the East and the demobilization of others in
the West and South have added to the break down. Efforts to bring coal
have partly succeeded, but lack of transportation piles it at pit
heads. Mills that should be turning out plows, rails, locomotives,
machinery for all Europe, are idle. Only 5 to 7 per cent of industry
is operating."
"Military officers whose position does not permit them to
come before the public, communicate with me and tell of frightful
conditions, especially in the East. One reports: ’In six months
large parts of Germany will be shelterless Euchenwalds of starved
corpses. Trains and trucks coming from the East with refugees from
the Polish and Czech territories are arriving with corpses and the
barely living, many of them children. These are often tossed out of
trains and trucks upon the roads.*
"In Berlin in August out of 2866 children born, 1148 died
—
and it was summer, and food more plentiful than now. The current issue
of the British Nineteenth Century and After in an article entitled
’Orderly and Humane’, draws the most horrifying picture since the
opening of the concentration camps.
"From Vienna a reliable source reports that in the Russian
(1) London Tribune, December 7, 1945, P. 19
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zone no one has had food except dried peas, bread, and a little oil in
six months. Infant mortality is approaching 100 percent; slight
ailments result in death from lack of resistance. Tuberculosis and
rickets are becoming universal.” (l)
Catherine Coyne in her series of articles appearing in
the Boston Herald relates the picture of the little children in the U.S.
zone who were forced to scavenge. Miss Coyne says, "to me they
constitute a farsadder spectacle than destroyed cities and wrecked
cathedrals. Here in Germany, children did the same thing in France, in
Belgium and in Holland, little boys and girls gather at meal time
beside the garbage barrel at Army mess centers. As soldiers emerge to
empty their messkits, the little ones hold up pails or baskets begging
for leavings—leavings frequently consisting of mixture of vegetables,
meat and fruit or pudding. At the larger messes, where troops eat from
plates, the children must wait for big barrels to be put out—then they
compete for advantageous positions for diving in for choice morsels of
discarded food. Children then trail troops to pick up discarded buts
which, remade into cigarettes, are sold for fabulous prices.”
Miss Coyne continues, ’’Truck drivers have a nerve-wracking
job on the potato run. For more than five miles they must run the gauntlet
of Berlin’s children, sharp, pale-faced little boys and girls, who have
memorized every turn and bump in the road that might be expected to jar
the truck sufficiently to knock off a potato or two. At these strategic
points, children lie in wait as quasi-legal hi-jackers. They are armed
with long sticks with nails on the ends for spearing potatoes, even
(1) Thompson, Dorothy, "Germany Skidding Into Abyss”, Boston Globe,
December 3, 1945.
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though frequently they must dart into the path of roaring trucks in
this dangerous game. Some of the older hoys use curved sticks to
knock the vegetables from the speeding trucks although they risk their
lives to do it. (1)
Bishop Henry Knox Sherrill, bishop of the Episcopal diocese
of Massachusetts, traveled extensively through Germany as a representa-
tive of the Federal Councils of Churches of Christ in America. Upon
his return to the United States, Bishop Sherrill said, "We must not
allow ourselves to be falsely sentimental about our former enemies,
but we should do all in our power to alleviate unnecessary suffering.
Worst of all conditions in Germany today is the expulsion of millions
from their homes in territory once German. This winter evacuation is
causing thousands of deaths and untold suffering. They are without
food, medical supplies, adequate clothing and shelter. Children and
old people die en route, many diseases are becoming epidemics and the
cruelty accompanying this evacuation will effect all of Europe and
manifest itself in vri.de spread disease in the present and in hatred
tomorrow.” (2)
Bishop Sherrill questioned whether it was necessary to
evacuate millions during the winter months. The trains pouring into
Berlin and other German cities contain the most pathetic specimens of
humanity imaginable, he declared. (3)
4. Attitude of U.S. Occupation Forces.
Fifteen months ago when it was evident the war against
(1) Coyne, Catherine, "Europe’s Children Scavenge Food”, Boston Herald,
November 26, 1945, P. 19.
(2) Boston Herald, December 12, 1945.
(3) Boston Post, December 12, 1945.
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Germany would continue through what promised to "be a severe winter,
American soldiers were buoying themselves by glumly saying to one
another: "Just wail until we get to Berlin and watch these Heinies
squirm." Now they are in Berlin. Now they see Germans squirm and
suffer—but they find no satisfaction in the spectacle. Rather they
find the role of conqueror a heavy weight on their hearts and a con-
stant irritation to their tempers.
Catherine Coyne relates observing guards from the 78th
Infantry Division kicking the bomb-scared wall of Berlin’s Anhalter
railway station in helpless rage and cursing "all stupid people."
They were not cursing the docile wrecks of humanity who stood or
sprawled on baggage or attempted pitiful bribery outside the station
as they waited with frantic optimism for opportunity to get a ticket and
train out of this depressingly evil capital. These men were decent
American youth who had been able to fight in battle, but were choked
with helpless rage by the mean degradation, by the slow starvation, by
the personal obscenities that make up the picture of the defeated
capital. (1) American men who killed in battle have found it hard to
witness the death of old people whose hearts were unable to continue
beating in their undernourished bodies. Their stomachs revolted at
the sight of tired children trying to retch from empty stomachs.
The teen age green troops never tested in battle who have
replaced the veterans find that the few duties assigned to occupation
troops keep them far from occupied. Their thoughts wander to their
homeland and defensively they work themselves up into almost a frenzy
of homesickness that spreads like wildfire among the troops. They are
(l) Coyne, Catherine, "G.I.’s Despise Conqueror Role", Boston Herald,
December 7, 1945.
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merely trying to escape the miserable conditions into which they have
been placed including German adults and children begging for scraps
of food, black market activities among civilians and military alike,
and certain officers living like rulers of a small empire and enjoying
with relish their tour of duty. All these factors incite the G.I. to
attend mass meetings and demand to be sent home which causes the United
States to lose face in the eyes of the German civilian population.
"A young combat soldier threw his helmet into a corner of
his barracks. He was inarticulate with rage, when he calmed down he said
quietly ’I guess they'd better send me home in a straightjacket because
I’m going insane. I thought we fought to make this a better world.
It gets worse here every day and I can’t do a thing about it. I want
to go home’". (1)
5. The Price Report.
Byron Price, an experienced observer, was asked by Presi-
dent Truman to go to Germany to study the relationship between the
American Forces of Occupation and the German people. His report to the
President dated December 9, 1945, embodies eight specific suggestions
which will be enumerated here. (2)
The principal problems as seen by Mr. Price were as follows:
1. "The entire basic structure of Military Government in
Germany, including the Potsdam Declaration, should be re-examined in the
light of experience and new conditions.
2. "The United States must decide whether we mean to finish
the job competently, and provide the tools, the detelimination and the
(1)
Coyne, Catherine, "G.I.’s Despise Conqueror Role", Boston Herald,
December 7, 1945.
(2) Department of State Bulletin, "Report of Byron Price to the
President", Volume XIII, Number 336, December 18, 1945, P. 885.
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funds requisite to that purpose or withdraw.
3. "We must decide whether we are going to permit starvation,
with attendant epidemics and disorders, in the American zone, or ship
the food to prevent it.
4. "We must decide whether obstructions raised by the French
Government, which have deadlocked the four-power Control Council at
Berlin, are to defeat the underlying purposes of Allied policy.
5. ,h#e have reached the stage where we must determine much
more specifically that we are going to do about minor hirelings of the
Nazi Party and its satellite agencies, and how far we are going in
destroying the industrial structure of Germany.
5. ’’Not of least Importance, it must be decided how fast and
how far the Government is to go in changing from military to civilian
control in Germany. Really competent civilian admirdstrative personnel
and advice must be provided from within the present governmental
establishment at Washington if any such change over is to have a
chance of succeeding.
7. "The urgency of these decisions is deepened not only by
the continuing four-power deadlock at Berlin, but by the approach of
winter. The next few months will be critical months. They will
determine whether the American Government, in its first large-scale
attempt at governing a conquered people, is to succeed, or fail, or abandon
the effort.
8. "As cold weather begins, millions find themselves housed
against the raw climate in rubble heaps and caves, without fuel for
heating, and with a food supply rated by medical standards well below
the level of subsistence. Just now these people are quiescent and law-
lessness is negligible, although epidemics begin to threaten the health
..
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of Western Europe. There is plenty of evidence, however, that the
Germans are nursing old and new hatreds with mounting bitterness as
their situation becomes more desperate; that they are listening hourly,
with traditional credulity, for the voice of whatever type of new leader
desperation may produce.” (l)
6. Eisenhower Statement.
In a statement which exhibited more bitterness than he
had hither to displayed publicly. General Dwight D. Eisenhower, formerly
commander of the United States Forces in the European Theater, defended
the great bulk of the occupation work done in Germany under his
command and expressed resentment at newspaper criticism vfhich took issue
with his policies.
Pointing to press suggestions that he was pursuing a
"softer” policy in Germany than was laid down at the Potsdam Conference,
Eisenhower declared that the Army under his command would "uproot Nazism
in every shape and form”, and that any American officer who did not put
his all into the denazification program would be transferred to another
assignment.
,
General Eisenhower conceded that ”we expect to have a
lowering of efficiency as a result of denazification and we are prepared
for that", but added that the American policy would in the long run,
"give the Germans a chance to dig themselves out of the gutter.” (2)
7. McNarney Report.
General Joseph McNarney, successor to General Eisenhower
(1) For complete text of Price Report, see Appendix.
(2) The Progressive, Volume IX, Number 42, December 2, 1945, P. 8.
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as commander of the United States Forces in the European Theater, in his
report to the President on December 27, 1945, presented a very grave and
pessimistic picture of Allied occupation of Germany. McNarney reported
that France’s holdout on Allied plans for governing occupied Germany
as a single unit, was creating an increasingly serious and difficult
problem. French refusal to cooperate in the economic policies as laid
down to govern Germany, has caused a great deal of unrest among the
civilian population. McNarney said that France is holding German
economy below the minimum level of tolerability and unless an under-
standing is immediately forthcoming, the Allied policy of government in
Germany may be recorded in history as a complete failure, (l)
8. U. S. Army Intelligence Survey.
An exhaustive compilation of opinions recorded in a 20,000
word report by officers of the Military Intelligence Service, was
released to officials of the United States Forces in the European
Theater in December, 1945. This report was described officially as
"more nearly true than any yet reported."
Bitter resentment and deep disappointment was voiced over
the "Americans" first six months of occupation, although there was
some praise for the improvements in transportation, health conditions,
book publishing, and entertainment.
The conduct of American soldiers is watched with growing
hatred and the Germans are especially incensed over American fraterniza-
tion with what the Germans call women of low character.
They also voiced resentment because they said American
soldiers dumped excess food into the gutter instead of dividing it with
(1) Boston Globe, December 28, 1945, P. 4.
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Germans.
The report also revealed that the Germans vilified the
post-war press, charging that exiles who had snug harbors outside the
country during the war had been selected by the Americans as editors,
and now were talking smugly to those who suffered during the conflict.
They also charged that low-grade reporters were venting personal spites
through the press.
Other complaints included what the Germans called the
inequities in the American denazification policies, the clashes between
American I.lilitary Government officials and their civilian appointees, the
reported lack of legal procedure in the prosecution of persons arrested
for war crimes and the delays in restoring even the minimum requirements
for the production of food and civilian commodities
.
(1)
The survey revealed unfavorable comparisions between con-
ditions in the American zone and those in the British, French and Russian
zones even though the Germans said looting, rape and the depletion of
native stock were rampant in the French zone and that conditions in the
Russian zone vrere fearful with destitution and wreckage everywhere.
The uncertainty as to the future program of the United
States was also reflected as torturing and demoralizing the population
generally, with the specter of a Russian invasion arid the absorbing of
Germany into a communist sphere dominating the thinking of the educated
as well as uneducated factions.
Discerning businessmen are baffled by the continual
reversal of orders and decisions by military government officials and
cannot understand why they can’t reopen plants that could furnish employment
(l) Ring, James F., Boston Globe, December 13, 1945, p. l.
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and needed goods. Plants assembling farm equipment are not even allowed
to operate, and without new farm machinery next year’s crop must also
fail and hunger continue. (1)
9. Problem of Feeding Germany.
The problem of feeding Germany is a grave one, and must
be dealt with immediately if mass starvation is to be avoided. In times
of peace, Germany, despite economical and scientific farming had to import
more than half of her foodstuffs. (2)
The "breadbasket" of Germany is occupied by the Russians
and Poles who stripped the fields and sent the crops eastward. The
troops of these nations also live off the country which has rapidly
depleted what stores of food were available. In the French zone all
foodstuffs were seized and sent to France and in the British zone little
arable land is available for cultivation. Small truck farms are located
in the southern portion of the United States zone, but they are now
overrun with refugees from other zones, and the farmers are unable to
procure fertilizer, seed and farm equipment that would allow them to
work their farms to maximum advantage.
The problem would seem to resolve itself into the
necessity of providing a diet of subsistence level for the civilian
population until they can again work their farms and resume trade with
other nations. The only nation able and vailing to provide this food
is the United States, and if it is not forthcoming soon, our problems
in Germany will be multiplied one hundred fold.
(1) McLaughlin, Kathleen, New York Times, December 3, 1945, P. 1.
(2) Stolper, Gustav, "German Economy", Reynald Hitchcock, New York,
1940, P. 245.
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10. Dismantling of -German industry.
The press has constantly carried reports of Russian
demand and receipt of industrial plants and equipment all over Germany.
The Russians moved in, dismantled the equipment, and carried it away to
Western Russia. It is true that Germany had a surplus of equipment
because her tremendous war production required it, and there is no
question but what the Russians are entitled to the surplus equipment in
the form of reparations. In the United States zone, however, we have
blown up a few plants not requisitioned by the Russians and would have
blown up a great many more if the State Department had not interceded.
The Germans have been for almost a century the most
highly industrialized nation on the Continent and supplied much of Europe
with the industrial goods and machinery required so badly at this time.
Theoretically Germany has still the skilled labor and the facilities to
continue supplying Europe with these goods in the form of reparations.
The Allies have agreed to control the production of metals, chemicals,
machinery, and other such items rather than calling for the destruction
or removal of all German industry which might be directly useful to a
war economy. However, the Russians continue to dismantle equipment and
at the end of February 1946, less than seven percent of German industry
was in operation, (l) The vast unemployment problem would also be aided
immeasurably if industries required in a normal peacetime economy were
placed in operation. The farmers need farm machinery to produce food
in great quantities and limited plant production will aid in making
Germany to some extent self supporting, thereby removing the burden
(1) New York Times, March 4, 1946.
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from the United States.
11. Unchecked inflation.
The four zones in Germany have been pumped full of in-
flationary "printing press" money by the respective occupying powers
and despite attempts at price control, inflation is enjoying a field day
and black markets thrive. It has reached a point now where German
civilians will work not for wages, but will only accept food or
cigarettes. One cigarette on the German market will purchase the
equal of five dollars worth of foodstuffs. The well-to-do Germans
continue to live well as they trade with black market operators, however,
the middle and working classes are subsisting on a starvation diet
which is becoming more serious as the spring approaches. Butter sells
on the black market for as much as two hundred dollars a pound and
cigarettes at twenty dollars a package. Clothing and fuel sell for
similar unreasonable prices which the average German cannot afford even
with the abundance of "printing press" money. The Germans have the
money, but it being next to worthless, will not purchase anything. The
American dollar is the actual standard of exchange and is considered
as such in black market circles. (1) It may be noted that until recently,
business conscious U.S. Military personnel who sold cheap watches,
clothing and equipment to Russian soldiers for fantastic prices, were
able to redeem the worthless Russian occupation paper in United States
currency with, of course, the United States standing the loss. However,
this situation has been corrected and new regulations have been promulgated
to end the costly practice.
C. Atrocities .
The Nazi atrocities as revealed in newspaper stories and photo-
graphs were unspeakable. They were almost unimaginable. Yet,
(l) Material assimilated by writer when associated with a federal
intelligence agency.
.
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every last one of them may be true and serve well the purpose of making
us hate a prostrate enemy; worse yet, a prostrate nation. They make
us hate not at a time when we have to fight, but at a time when we
have to build a new world, a better world than the one that produced
the Nazis.
1. Mass punishment.
It is our duty, and we have not shirked it, to track down
the individual criminals, assess the degree of the offense in each case
and administer exact justice. It might have been easier to punish
a whole people who now suffering from disease and famine are undergoing
punishment enough. Hitler would have indicted the whole people if
conditions were reversed, but in all fairness the war criminals tried
will probably be less than two percent of the total population.
Newspaper reports fortified by photographs, told us the
story, but commonly overlooked was the fact that the majority of atrocity
victims were themselves German citizens who for racial or political
reasons were confined to camps. United States prisoners of war were
not at any time placed in the infamous camps, and although subjected
to some unnecessarily harsh treatment in many instances, most liberated
prisoners agreed that they were treated according to the rules set
forth by the Geneva Convention.
Goebels once said, "Even if we lose the war, we will win,
because our ideals will have penetrated the hearts of our enemies."
The Nazis were fighting for a fancies or real injustice, and if they
drove us to commit another injustice, they would have won what they were
..
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fighting for, (l)
2. Vengeance.
Atrocity stories sold newspapers and intensified the
demand for a severe peace. Atrocity stories, if they succeeded in
pursuading us that the whole German population was subhuman, would
justify the dismemberment of Germany. Atrocity stories could drive us
insane with hatred and divert us from the pressing problems that antedate
Hitler. Spitting on Mussolini’s corpse, or cutting the heart out of
Hitler, or hitching a Japanese to a plow, may be sweet, but will it help
us in our fanatic desire to build a better world?
Hitler rose to power in Munich with the single slogan of
vengeance—vengeance against the real or fancied injustices of Versailles.
Every Hitler has arisen that way, and it is our problem to prevent a
future Hitler from inflaming the minds of his people with accounts of
injustice and revenge.
3. French Version.
The following is based on revelations made in France in a
number of conservative and Catholic papers including Figaro, Temps,
Presents, and Temoignage Chretien, as well as reports of American
correspondents among them Drew Middleton of the New ¥ork Times.
In an article in Figaro headed, ”>Ye Should Not Resemble
Them,” the following accusations are made:
”In certain camps for German prisioners of war, living
skeletons may be seen, almost like those in German concentration camps,
and deaths from undernourishment are numerous. We learn that prisoners
have been savagely and systematically beaten and some have been employed
(l) Mayer, Milton, uLet the Swiss do It,” The Progressive, Volume 9
Number 20, May 14, 1945.

- 107 -
in removing mines without protection equipment so that they have been
condemned to death sooner or later."
The paper continues, "People, of course, will point to
the Gestapo tortures, the gas chambers, and the mountain of human bodies
found in the internment camps in Germany. But these horrors should not
become sports competition in which we endeavor to outdo the Nazis, If
the Allies intend to deliver blow for blow and eye for eye, the horror
will never end. We have to judge the enemy, but we have a duty not to
resemble him."
United States Army authorities who have turned over at
least a million healthy prisoners of war to the French, only to have two
hundred thousand starved and diseased men returned because they were no
longer fit for work requested the American Red Cross to make an investi-
gation. The Red Cross officials brought back a thorough and complete
report that not only confirmed the previously reported conditions, but
included pictures of prisoners that were not unlike those taken at Dachau
and Buchenwald.
French industry, according to the Red Cross, was paying
their slave labor the same wage as to French workers, so as to meet the
protests of the French unions, but these wages, an average of 150 francs
a day, would go to the Government, not to the prisoners. The Government
in turn would pay the prisoners 10 francs and the upkeep of the prisoners
would cost only about 40 francs. The operation would leave a net
profit of 175,000,000 francs a day which the French Government did
not wish to lose.
The United States Army after receiving this report.
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required France to provide specific guarantees of adequate treatment of
prisoners if she were to receive further shipments, since many high
officers felt that the Army’s honor had been sullied by the manner in
which the French treated the prisoners captured by United States forces.
However, from September through January 90,000 skeletons were returned
to the United States Army including 10,000 stretcher cases. The French
promised to mend the error of their ways, but it is not quite clear if
they ever did so. (l)
D. The Peace .
Whatever the future holds in store for us, every decent human being
must be grateful that the use of wholesale murder to achieve a new
order in Europe, is at an end. Everyone who has a spark of humanity in
his soul must feel that the ending of the slaughter of human beings for
five and one half years is beyond price. Never since the Middle Ages
have women and children, as well as unarmed men, the aged, the sick, the
miserable everywhere been so brutally and ruthlessly destroyed. The
aftermath of victory in Germany and the occupied countries must of
necessity make greater demands upon our resources, our statesmanship,
and upon our ability to overcome difficulties greater than we have ever
encountered before.
1. Victory for whom?
This was the German situation in April, 1945. We occupied
a country 'with its urban life completely shattered, many of its factories
destroyed, its homes in a number of cities 90 percent obliterated,
local transportation lines out of business, electric light systems
gutted, every normal civic process at an end, and all
»
(1) Clair, Louis, "The Revival of the Slave Trade", The Progressive,
Volume 10, Number 2, January 14, 1946.
.-
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government officials under grave suspicion, or expelled, or dead.
Almost every bank was wiped out and only one insurance
company survived. The owners of homes had no redress; the holders of
mortgages had no security left; the owners of stocks and bonds dug them
out from under tons of rubble; and the beneficiaries of the insured were
unable to collect their money. As for government bonds, they were
worthless. The survivors of the Armed Services after being demobilized,
could not seek employment when the entire industrial machinery was
prostrate and destroyed .
This is the utter chaotic condition in which the Allies
found Germany, a country suffering from a complete collapse of the social
and political economy.
Judge Samuel Rosenman reported to President Truman upon
returning from Europe:
’’United States economy would be deeply affected unless north-
west Europe again resumes its place in the international exchange of
goods and services. Furthermore, a chaotic and hungry Europe is not a
fertile ground in which stable democratic, and friendly governments
can be reared, (l)
2. Meetings of the Big Three.
Dorothy Thompson, in her syndicated column written on
the eve of the meeting of the Big Three Foreign Ministers at Moscow,
seemed to sense the cynical attitude of. many Americans regarding peace
and cooperation in the world to be.
Miss Thompson wrote, ’’One cannot lock forward with con-
fidence to the outcome of the meeting among the Big Three Foreign
(1) Villard, Oswald G., "After Victory", The Progre ssive. Volume 9,
Number 23, May 14, 1945.
..
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Ministers. The last meeting broke up over Molotov's demand for exclusion
of France and China. They will not be present at this one. It was
Yfashington' s turn to be host—but the meeting is in Moscow. The press
won't be there at all.”
"Yfe are afraid of the communique that eventually will be issued.
Most people ivill not read it through—for the people are afraid. They
have a sense that wrong doing is going on; they do not want to learn
more about the wrong doing, because they can do nothing about it. IT/hen
there is nothing you can do, after a while you cease to think about
what ought to be done, or could be done.
"The people do not accept what is going on. They do not reject
it in any organized way, but they do not accept it. They feel we are
not going in the right directi on- -not at all in the right direction--
perhaps not in any direction. The people feel alarm, but do not know
why.
"The leaders have taken away the peoples' ideals, and when that
happens, despair sets in, not despair over material things, but despair
over everything pertaining to the world of tomorrow. The war is sense-
less, everything is a lie, as the Atlantic Charter became a lie when
Yalta and Potsdam became the truth
.
"Then everybody fears everyone else, because the cohesion of
the people is an emotion of faith, an ideal that faith says can be
realized; but where there is no common faith in an ideal, there is only
cynicism, and that divides everybody from everybody else. That is dis-
integration.
"The Big Three are called 'Russia*, 'Great Britain', the 'United
States’, but the people know that 'Russia', 'Great Britain', and the 'United
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States’ are not meeting in Moscow. The Big Three are just three men, and
the people do not think they are greater or bigger than others like them-
selves.
"Lincoln and Jefferson still sound like the United States.
F. D. R. sounded like the United States, when he stayed home. Churchill
sounded like Great Britain in the blitz; he sounded like Shakespeare and
Burke. But the communiques from Yalta and Potsdam did not sound like
the United States or Great Britain or Russia, as I have heard her in
great literature. They sounded curiously' like Hitler.
"The people feel as though they were in the world, and yet
not in it, for they have nothing to say about it, they must accept it,
and they are hurt, bewildered and angry." (1)
3. Morgenthau Plan.
Henry Morgenthau, Jr.’s plan for disposing of Germany as
set forth in his book "Germany is Our Problem", purports to be in the
interests not only of the victorious United Nations, but in the interests
of the German people as well.
The book is obviously written for the "men in the street"
with a twinkle of the eye for the expert; "Well you know, for them
you’ve got to lay it on a bit thick"--which makes for another wry
commentary on the strength of the democratic convictions of a long-time
high official of the United States Government.
Disraeli once said that there are three sorts of lies;
Lies by affirmation, lies by omission, and statistics. Here are some of
Mr. Morgenthau’ s "Statistics";
(1) Thompson, Dorothy, "People Seen in Mute Anger as Big Three Meet in
Moscow", Boston Glove, December 17, 1945.
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Morgenthau wants to eliminate all German heavy industry
and to resettle the surplus population of many millions on the land.
But where is the land to come from since large slices of Germany will be
cut off, while the population will remain the same? The author per-
forms all sorts of juggler’s operations to accomplish this miracle.
Operation No. 1. The size of his new farms will be twelve
acres, which he proclaims to be quite sufficient to support a family.
Has anybody in America seen a family farm of twelve acres? '.Tell, in
Germany also a reasonable size of a farm that can support a family is
about thirty-five acres on the average.
Operation No. 2. Yfriere is the land for even the millions
of twelve acre farms to come from? Morgenthau affirms: ’’Mostly from
splitting up of the landed estates". He forgets to mention the large
landed estates are mainly east of the Oder-Neisse line and have thus
been taken away from Germany through the Potsdam decisions.
Operation No. 3. Morgenthau admits that though the Hitler
regime made extraordinary efforts to attain self-sufficiency in foodstuffs,
it never succeeded and had to continue food imports. (1) But he never-
theless wants Germany not only to become self-sufficient, but even to export
foodstuffs to pay for all the necessary imports of raw materials and
products of heavy industry. He says that it would be comparatively easy
to increase yields by more intensive farming methods. Yet, it is common
knowledge that the yield per acre of most crops is smaller on small farms
than on large ones--therefore, agricultural produce in the future would
(1) See Chapter IV, Subheading 6, "Agriculture”
><
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be less, not more than in the past.
Operation No. 4. Morgenthau wants to make us believe that
it is possible to eliminate the heavy industry of a country without in
any way changing the structure of the rest of the economy. In fact, it is
obvious that elimination of heavy industry means fantastic dislocations
in other industries and elimination of millions of other jobs.
Operation No. 5. Morgenthau proposes that all Germans should
be driven from the Ruhr Valley, their place in the mines to be taken by
French, Belgian, Dutch and other workers. The truth is that the French,
Belgians and Dutch don’t even have enough miners to exploit their own
mines. Therefore, Morgenthau’ s proposal amounts to the complete
elimination of Europe’s main production center, i.e., to the partial de-
industrialization not only of Germany, but of the rest of Europe.
The list could be continued indefinitely and not one of the
arguments can stand up in the light of inquiry, but they are not meant
to. The book was 'written not for serious discussion, but to confuse the
already bewildered and uninformed citizen.
A de-industrialized Germany means a weakened Europe, because
the whole of Europe's economy is dependent on German industry. Yfhat
Morgenthau proposes means catastrophe for the entire continent.
4. Potsdam Declaration.
The basic pattern of Allied peacemaking was unveiled at a
Prussian palace in Potsdam in August, 1945, when the Big Three--Generalissimo
Josef Stalin, Prime Minister Clement Attlee, and President Harry Truman
—
released a 7,000 word document detailing the results of their 17-day
conference behind locked doors.
..
.
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It was a hard peace they drew—harsher by far than the re-
pressive provisions of the Treaty of Versailles. The Pact of Potsdam
carved off great sections of Germany and handed them to Soviet Russia
and Poland. It decreed the stripping of German factories—for the
benefit of Russia— so as to leave Germany helpless not only to wage
war, but to rebuild a great industrial economy.
The Potsdam conference left many critical issues unsolved.
Not once is the ^ear or Middle East mentioned. The problems over the
Dardanelles, Turkey, and the oil reserves of the Middle East no where are
discussed in the declaration by the Big Three. Many major decisions were
left for the proposed Council of Foreign Ministers, including, pre-
sumably, determination over Allied partition of Italian colonies.
Among the principal provisions in the Potsdam statement
were these:
TERRITORIAL AGGRANDIZEMENT
Soviet Russia and her satellite, Poland, emerged from Potsdam
with huge slices of German territory. The U.S.S.R., already enriched by
many thousands of square miles wrested from old Poland under the terms
of her pact with the Nazis, grabbed an additional 5,400 miles of East
Prussia at Potsdam, and won Attlee-Truman acceptance of her demand for
the ice-free German port of Aoenigsberg.
Soviet-dominated Poland also did handsomely at Potsdam. She
was given those parts of East Prussia which the Russians didn’t take,
Pomerania, and mouth-filling slices of West Prussia, and Upper and Lower
Silesia. Included in the Polish booty is the old Polish Corridor, the
former Free City of Danzig, and the Baltic shipbuilding center of Stettin,
which has been under German control for 225 years*
..
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Poland’s western frontier will run to within a few miles of
Berlin itself, along the Oder and the western Neisse Rivers to the
Czechoslovakian frontier.
The Pact of Potsdam does not complete the dismemberment of
Germany or the aggrandizement of the Allies. The claims of France,
Belgium, and Holland on Germany’s western frontier have not yet been
filled by the conquerors.
STATUS OF GERMANY
The Pact of Potsdam establishes the principle that "in
organizing the German economy, primary emphasis shall be given to the
development of agriculture and peaceful domestic industries."
The Big Three asserted that they were determined to wipe out
German Nazism and militarism for all time, but they assured the world
that "it is not the intention of the Allies to destroy or enslave the
German people. It is the intention of the Allies that the German
people be given the opportunity to prepare for the eventual reconstruction
of their lives on a democratic and peaceful basis."
Nevertheless, despite this pious assurance, the Big Three pro-
ceeded to make it as difficult as they could to enable the democratic
forces in Germany to lead the way to reconstruction. The Pact of Potsdam
provides for the complete disarmament of Germany—which every non-Nazi
everywhere applauds—but in planning for this purpose, the Big Three
ordered the deindustrialization of Germany, the looting of her factories
by the Allies, principally Russia, and the saddling of such fantastic
economic restrictions on conquered Germany as to render her reconstruction
as a stable, democratic force in Europe virtually impossible.
..
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Politically, the Potsdam planners provided that "all democratic
political parties with rights of assembly and of public discussion shall
be allowed and encouraged throughout Germany. " However, "for the time
being there can be no central German government." Local self-government
is ordered restored throughout Germany on democratic principles and in
particular "through elective councils as rapidly as is consistent with
military security and the purposes of military occupation."
Similarly, "subject to the necessity of maintaining military
security," the Big Three decreed that "freedom of speech, press, and
religion shall be permitted, and religious institutions shall be respected."
REPARATIONS
The three victorious Powers agreed to exact their separate
reparations from Germany only in the separate zones wnich each of the Big
Three occupy and from "appropriate external assets," with one major ex-
ception. This is that Russia, in addition to the loot from her own zone,
shall be entitled to take from areas occupied by American, Britain, and
France 25 percent of the industrial capital equipment deemed not neces-
sary to support a German "peace economy".
In the reparations clauses of the Potsdam statement Soviet
Russia makes its domination of Poland official. "The U.S.S.R." announces
the Pact of Potsdam, "undertakes to settle the reparation claims of
Poland from its own share of reparations."
Payment of reparations, said the Eig Three, "should leave
enough resources to enable the German people to subsist without external
assistance". Russia generously agreed to waive all claims to the
Germal gold seized by the Allies, preferring instead the right to strip
Germany of factories, machines, machine tools, and equipment desired by
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the Soviet Union for her own development and expansion.
COUNCIL OF FOREIGN MINISTERS
The Big Three created a council of Foreign Ministers, of which
France and China would also be represented, to meet regularly in London,
beginning September 1, 1945. As its major task, "the Council shall be
authorized to draw up, with a view to their submission to the United
Nations, treaties of peace with Italy, Rumania, Bulgaria, Hungary, and
Finland, and to propose settlements of territorial questions outstand-
ing on the termination of the war in Europe."
OTHER POTSDAM PROVISIONS
1. The Kommandantur of Berlin, whereby control of Germany
is maintained by Russian-American-British-French commanders in the
German capital, is continued, but "so far as is practicable, there shall
be uniformity of treatment of German population throughout Germany".
2. The Big Three announced that they would welcome membership
in the United Nations organizatiin by the nations which remained neutral
in World Yfar II, except Franco Spain.
3. The Messrs. Truman and Attlee placed their stamp of approval
on Stalin' s Polish regime and reaffirmed their decision to have nothing to
do with the London Polish group. Also, the Three Powers approved the
decision of the Polish provisional government to hold "free and unfettered
elections as soon as possible and on the basis of universal suffrage
and secret ballot in which all democratic and anti-Nazi parties shall
have the right to take part and to put forward candidates". (1)
(l) The Progressive, Volume 9, Number 33, August 13, 1945.
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5. Byrnes Statement
The State Department on December 11, 1945, made public a
broad-scale economic policy for Germany which called upon the United States
and other Allied powers to finance a program of German imports in 1946
and 1947. There was no estimate of the amount of money involved in the
proposed financial aid, but it was believed that the American share might
run into hundreds of millions of dollars. The policy called for starting
a slow recovery in the spring and was aimed at getting Germany back on
its feet economically and industrially in 1948. This meant a "delayed
process of reconstruction" in the Reich to give a head start on post
war recovery to the European neighbors that Germany once overran. Under
this plan the German standard of living in 1948 would not be allowed to
exceed that of its European neighbors, but neither would Germany be
reduced "to a country of -foresters or goat herders". German industry was
to be sharply restricted to minimum peacetime needs at the outset.
This State Department declaration was the first formal inter-
pretation by any of the powers of the broad principles of German control
agreed upon at the Potsdam Conference. The announced objective was to
disarm Germany industrially and leave her at least as weak as neighboring
countries
.
The immediate cause of the statement was the result of the
receipt of a list of six questions submitted by the War Department for
guidance on how much industrial and economic resources were to be left
to the German people. The statement covered a two-year period effective
February 7, 1946, at the conclusion of which Germany should emerge as a
weakened, but self-sufficient European nation, able to begin balancing
needed imports against exports and to work toward repayment of the
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financial assistance required from the Allied powers during the two-year
reparation period, (l)
In an accompanying statement. Secretary of State, James F.
Byrnes, set forth four American aims for Germany. (2)
1. To increase "to the greatest possible extent the
export of coal from Germany” to liberated areas of
Europe.
2. To organize the machinery necessary to carry out
the reparations and disarmament program laid down by
United States, Great Britain and Russia at the Potsdam
Conference
.
3. To set up national centralized German administra-
tion agencies for finance, transport communications,
foreign trade and industry, (creation of these agencies
hitherto blocked by French.)
4. To prevent "mass starvation in Germany, but not
to give the Germans a higher priority on supplies
than the rest of Europe.
Comments on the Byrnes Plan were immediately forthcoming from foreign
capitals. British circles unofficially declared that an attempt by the
United States to by-pass France and effect centralization plans for
Germany would be met with strong objections from Russia.
The French reiterated their position that they would not
even discuss centralization of Germany unless the Ruhr and Rhineland were
excluded from Germany’s scope and the administration of a centralized
Germany confined to non-German hands.
(1) New iork Times, December 11, 1945, P. 1.
(2) Text of Secretary Byrnes' Statement on German policy appears in Appendix.
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Russia offered no official coiranent on the Eyrnes Plan. (1)
6. Kilgore Committee Findings,
The United States Senate's Kilgore Committee received a
mass of testimony regarding the close ties between Nazi cartels and some
of America's most powerful corporations. This official data, collected in
conquered Germany by special investigators for the War, Treasury and
Justice Departments, supported wartime disclosures of the Senate Patents
Committee and other investigating bodies showing how decisively such
corporate giants as Standard Oil Company of New Jersey, the Aluminum
Company of America, E. I. Du Pont de Nemours, the Dow Chemical Company,
and the Ethyl Export Corporation contributed to the building of the Nazi's
war machine. New evidence introduced by the Committee confirmed charges
that I. G. Farben held back United States production of vital magnesium
while its production expanded rapidly, and through Standard Oil, Farben
prevented establishment of a synthetic rubber industry.
t
Also according to evidence placed before the Kilgore
Committee, Farben got from Standard Oil both the patent processes and secret
formulas for manufacturing high octane gasolene and tetraethyl lead; with-
out which the Nazi Luftwaffe could never have attained its deadly potency.
"Farben exploited its cartel connections with American firms",
the report adds, "not only toobtain these important processes, but also
to obtain certain critical war materials. Because of its relations with
Standard Oil, Farben, acting as agent for the German Government was able
to contract for $20,000,000 worth of high-grade lubricants and gasolene.
This fuel was transported to Germany and stored there". (2)
(1) Mangeot, Sylvain, "Byrnes Plan Heightens Confusion", Reuters,
December 6, 1945.
(2) For further details refer to Chapter TV, Subheading 8, "Cartels".
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7. Colmer Committee Report.
A Nouse of Representatives Committee composed of eighteen
Democrats and Republicans headed by Representative William M. Colmer
of Mississippi, Democrat, returned from an extensive inspection of war-
torn Europe in November, 1945, and released a report that verified the
plight of Germany.
"A ’hard’ peace,” says the Committee report, ’’requires the
elimination of eight or ten millions of Germans, it would be much more
humane to eliminate them at once. The Committee feels that the American
antipathy to theories of racism includes an antipathy to the theory of
racial guilt. These Germans who will suffer will in the main be the very
old who generally opposed Hitler and the very young who were hardly re-
sponsible for him”
.
’’The Committee warns that the prevention of a catastrophe in
Middle Europe will impose a further heavy burden on the taxpayers of
the United States and upon our occupying armies, if the present con-
tradictory directives stress reparations and the elimination of all
industry that can even indirectly support a war as against the necessity
for a minimum standard of living for the German people".
"The Committee cannot refrain from asking the simple question:
'What incentive under this plan exists for Germany to turn to democratic
ways?’ It is our belief that the American people will be held responsible,
for we have allowed the Russians to partition Germany and strip the
country of food, which is another way of saying the American taxpayer
must pay for the looting done by the Red Army of the food needed to
keep the German people from starving.
"The Committee believes that to strip Germany of her trans-
t-
.
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pbrtation equipment and the machinery of her factories, can mean only
one of two things:
(a) that a considerable part of the German population must
be liquidated through disease, malnutrition, and slow starvation for
years to come, with the resultant dangers to the rest of Europe from
pestilence and the spread of plagues that know no boundaries.
(b) The continuation both of large occupation forces to hold
down 'unrest' and the affording of relief mainly drawn from the United
States to prevent actual starvation”. (1)
8, Clay Report.
The report of United States economic experts to Lieut.
General Lucius D. Clay, deputy military governor of the United States
zone in Germany, recommended the restoration of enough German industry to
maintain minimum living standards and to export needed materials to other
parts of Europe. Destruction of Germany as an industrial nation, is
viewed as a blow to Europe as well as to the Germans, and the Committee
observes:
"If the whole future recovery of Europe is to be geared to
fear of the bogey of Germany, reduced in its boundaries and stripped of
its war making capacity, as modern Germany is, the recovery of Europe
becomes a hopeless problem". (2)
(1) Lawrence, David, Boston Traveler, November 13, 1945.
(2) United States News, Volume XIX, Number 41, November 12, 1945
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CHAPTER VII
POSTWAR FUTURE OF GERMANY
A. Discord Among Allies .
The danger that the Allies might adopt rival policies toward Germany
was apparent during the war years, for each of the Big Four had its own
particular national interests in Germany. Recognizing these
different emphases in the attitude of the various Allies towards Germany,
the Big Three made several efforts during the war to coordinate their
plans for the future of the Reich. These attempts, however, never
succeeded in going beyond mere sketches of broad objectives and general
descriptions of the kind of Germany the Allies were determined to destroy.
1. Hoover Study.
In an effort to secure a workable agreement in Germany,
American occupation authorities authorized a group of experts, headed
by Calvin hoover, Duke University economist, to study the problem.
Instead of attempting to ascertain the general European standard of
living, these economists set out to find an average year in Germany,
before the war boom began, as the basis for calculating the German’s
peacetime needs. Having selected 1932 as a year these experts used
this standard as a yardstick for measuring the probable effects of the
Potsdam plans, and concluded that their provisions for industrial dis-
armament and wholesale reparations were incompatible with Germany’s
peacetime needs. The authors of the report pointed out, in a memorandum
submitted to the Allied Control Council for discussion, that Germany
even before the war was forced to manufacture goods for export in order
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to buy food abroad, and since the country now had lost its richest
territories in the east, it is more dependent than ever on imports of
food. The Committee recommended, therefore, that Germany be permitted
a sufficient industrial revival to balance its exports at the 1932 level.
2. Russian Objections.
Russian members of the Allied Control Council found this
American effort to interpret the Potsdam provision for Germany's peace-
time needs highly unsatisfactory, however, because they realized that
restoration of German production to its 1932 level v/ould permit the
removal of only a small amount of industrial reparations from ‘.Yestern
Germany. Faced by sharp Russian protests. General Lucius Clay lamely
declared the Hoover Report had been submitted merely as a basis for
discussion and did not represent American policy. (2)
3. British View.
Although the British have not made any official attempts
to define Germany's minimum requirements, Britain’s concern lest Germany's
economic collapse adversely affect its own economy and that of Western
Europe predisposes London to be at least in general agreement with the
findings of the Hoover Committee. (3) Russia, on the other hand, appears
unperturbed by the effects on Europe of a marked decline in German
industrial production, and the bilateral trade pacts the Soviet Union
has signed with Rumania, Bulgaria and Hungary seem to indicate that the
U.S.S.R. proposes to take over the role Germany formerly played in the
economies of the central and eastern European countries. (4)
(1) New iork Times, November 8, 1945, P. 29
(2) Ringvrood, 0. D., "Allies at Odds on Germany's Peacetime Needs", Foreign
Policy Reports, Volume XXI, Number 16, November 1, 1945, P. 232.
(3) Economist, September 8, 1945, P. 322.
( 4 ) New York Times, October 23, 1945, P. 3.
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4. Difficulty in Devising Peacetime Economy.
The difficulties of reaching a working agreement on Germany’s
peacetime economic needs thus reflect the divisions, or at least the
different emphases, that exist among the principal allies as they face
the German problem. Until the We stern allies and Russia succeed in
resolving these difficulties and agree on a formula for determining
Germany’s minimum standard of living, the nations charged with the
occupation of the Reich will find themselves hampered in their attempts
to disarm German industry and settle reparations claims, as well as in
their efforts to undertake the orderly reconstruction of Europe.
B. Shift in United states--British Viewpoint.
After expenditure of nearly $200,000,000,000 to win a war in
Europe, a figure of $700,000,000 is beginning to complicate an argument
over how to make that victory stick. The $700,000,000 represents the an-
nual cost of supporting American forces that are to occupy Germany.
An issue now is arising over the question of who should pay the
$700,000,000, the German people or the American tax-payers. On the
surface, that appears to be a very simple issue, with American taxpayers
inclined to be unanimous in nominating the German people as payers.
Actually, the issue involved is fundamental and is upsetting the agree-
ments signed by President Truman at Potsdam.
1. Expensive Supporting Prostrate Germany.
IF AMERICAN TAXPAYERS are to bear the cost of supporting
American troops in Germany, they will have to find about $700,000,000
a year to provide pay, subsistence, travel and other costs. That is a
minimum figure for 400,000 men and assumes that considerable food and
some materials can come from the Germans. It takes no account of any
cost of relief supplies for the German people.
'.
t
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IF GERMANS ARE FORCED to bear the cost of supporting
American troops in Germany, then the Germans must be permitted to work
hard enough to produce a surplus of goods for export so that they can pay
for imports required to support occupying forces. But, if permitted to
work that hard, then the Germans must have an industry in which to work.
If they have an industry, that industry cannot be destroyed or moved to
France, Holland or Belgium and it cannot be shipped to Russia in the way
agreed upon by the Big Three at Potsdam.
Four years went by before U.S., Britain and France bumped
against that issue after World War 1. It has taken about two months to
discover after World War il that Germany either could pay reparations on
a continuing basis out of exports, or she could be denied exports and
then default on reparations other than those involved in taking German
physical assets.
THE CHOICE between these two courses is being pointed up
by developments. At Potsdam, the decision of ^resident Truman was that
German industry should be stripped down to a level that would permit
the German people to have a living standard no higher than that of the
average of nations in Europe. That decision rested upon the apparent
conclusion that the American people would bear an important part of the
cost of occupying Germany in order to make sure that the German people
did not rebuild an industry with which to prepare for a third war.
2. A Solution.
THE PROBLEM is one of assuring Germany an industrial base
that will permit her to sell abroad about $700,000,000 worth more than she
buys so that she may pay part of the cost of occupation and have a living
standard equal to the average expected in Europe by 1949.
..
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.
.
- 127 -
THE SOLUTION OFFERED is to permit Germany to retain a large
part of her strictly nonpar industry. It is proposed, for example, that
Germany retain steel capacity of about 10,000,000 tons. Present capac-
ity is 19,000,000 tons. Hroduction in pre-Hitler Germany of 1932, a
depression year was 5,500,000 tons. Synthetic oil, synthetic rubber,
most synthetic nitrogen plants and some machine-tool capacity would be
marked for destruction or removal. So would aircraft, shipbuilding and
armament plants. Coal mining would be stimulated.
THE EFFECT of this proposed solution would be to encourage
industrial activity in the part of Germany not occupied by Russia. It
would depend upon disarmament of Germany in terms of actual weapons,
rather than in terms of industries destroyed. It would deny to Russia
important industrial facilities that she now expects to receive from
Western Germany under terms of the Potsdam Agreement. Russia gets 25
percent of all machinery and materials tagged for removal. If few are
tagged, Russia's share is small. (1)
C . Industrial Restoration .
With her industries almost completely destroyed and her cities
reduced to stone quarries and masses of rubble, German militarism will
be no threat for a long time. The population changes make the dominant
race myth no longer tenable. By 1970 according to the Office of
Population Research, Russia (1940 area) will have 43 million young men
of ages 15 to 35. All north-west and central Europe (all countries
west of Russia except Poland and Lithuania) will have only 30 million of
the same ages, of which Germany's portion will be about one-third.
These figures take no account of the effect of World 7/ar II, which will
reduce the figures for Germany disproportionately, nor of the vast addi-
tions to Russian-dominated territory since 1940.
(1) United States News, Volume XIX, Number 38, October 19, 1945, P. 19.
.
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The stage is set for Germany’s conversion to new ideals, but
whether this is accomplished will depend largely on British and American
aid in the rebuilding of German prosperity.
1. Competition and Markets.
The restoration of German industry means the restoration of
an industrial competitor, and largely by Anglo-American aid. Two theories
here contend for acceptance.
One holds that Germany should be de-industrialized. This
is said to be for the purpose of preventing her military resurgence;
but it is also, in part, a rationalization of the desire to capture
German markets. This view neglects the importance of German industry
for the general rehabilitation of Europe, which is demanded on both
humanitarian and political grounds. It also neglects the effects of
unilateral action by Russia in coordinating German interests with her own.
The hope, especially cultivated in England, of taking over
former German markets in southeastern Europe has waned since Russia
blithely laid hands on those promised lands.
German rearmament can be prevented by factory inspection
as long as effective will to do so lasts. Nothing can prevent rearmament
when such determination ceases.
The alternative view favors the speedy rehabilitation of
German industry. The basic reason for this is political; to increase
hope and cultivate a new political orientation, to check further social
disorganization in Germany, and facilitate the restoration of civilized
life throughout central Europe, (l)
(l) Hankins, Frank H., "A Plea for Industrial Restoration”, The
Progressive, Volume IX Number 28, July 2, 1945.
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2. Bernard Baruch’s Contention.
Bernard Baruch stakes the future peace and prosperity of
the world on the disarmament and industrial crippling of Germany and
Japan. He would prevent the products of their ’’sweated labor" from entering
our markets and thus reducing our standard of living. He would thus raise
the standard of living of the entire world—except, of course, in those
two countries.
"We envisage the United States supplying the tools, machines,
and equipment that will make the rest of the world as productive as we
are" he said recently.
Nothing is seen here except illogicalness. If we must
cease trade with all nations with lower standards of living, then we can
trade with none. Germany had the highest standard outside of the English-
speaking nations: Japan the highest among the billion population of Asia.
Will the standard of living of the world be raised by cutting off their
trade?
Industrial nations have long found in each other their best
markets. Europe has long been our greatest buyer, and after Great Britain
has come Germany. With some concessions on the tariff frontier, Germany
can absorb nearly as much of our exports as all South America, and she
would be as good a credit risk.
Nor is it true, as Baruch contends, that by destroying German
industry we will increase our prosperity by capfcuring her former markets.
We might, and doubtless shall, capture some of thegi, but on balance we
are bound to lose. Most international trade is three-cornered. If
Germany sells less, she will buy less, so that we shall find our own sales
reduced both in Germany and among her own customers. It is for this reason
that our tariff and the Ottawa Agreement proved so fatal in the '30’s.
What Baruch really advocates is scarcity all around.
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To be sure, Germany has been a competitor; but international
trade, in its economic aspects, is exactly like internal trade between
sections of this country. One section does not profit by the impoverish-
ment of another, even when it gets some of the latter’s industries. The
South has taken some of New England's cotton industry, but Southern
prosperity has been more than compensated by increased purchases of the
thousand and one products of other New England industries.
3. A Recommendation.
What to do with Germany is obviously a weighty problem,
but here are two contentions:
(1) That the harsh treatment of the German people
is not psychologically sound or politically astute.
(2) That the restoration of German industrial pros-
perity is both politically and economically wise
from the standpoint of our own interests.
As the "New Statesman and Nation" of London, noting the
widespread fear of a third world war, said:
"The real cause of alarm is that no one of the surviving
great powers is restrained in its doings by obedience to a code of
principles". (1)
D. Reparations .
1. Yibrld War I Experience.
After the first World War, the reparations bill was arrived
at by adding all sorts of things—including pensions for war veterans and
payments made to their families while they were in service--reached only
$33,000,000,000. Germany was given 70 years to pay this reparations bill.
She would not have finished, under the Young Plan, until 1988. (2)
(1) Hankins, Frank H., "A Plea for Industrial Restoration", The Progressive,
Volume IX, Number 28, July 2, 1945.
(2) See Chapter 111, Subheading "Young Plan".
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But still Germany failed to pay. The most comprehensive
study sets the total that Germany paid up to the time of the Hoover
moratorium in 1931 at 36,481,200,000 reichsmarks, or about $9,120,300,000.
A great deal of this went to pay the costs of collection, for the army of
occupation, for interest, and for various other expenses.
Germany tackled that debt with her industrial machine intact.
Her people were hungry and there were food riots. Eut the plants were
there, ready to make peacetime goods. This time, the German industrial
plant has been shattered by bombs, and the transportation system completely
disrupted and destroyed, (l)
2. Claims.
The total of the claims against Germany, even if only the
most obvious damages to civilians are counted, far outrun her capacity
to pay in full. The taking of all movable assets—raw materials, farm
machinery, livestock, machine tools, even German labor --still leave a
broad gap between the damage done and the recompense.
There are civilian victims in Europe by the millions.
i
Property of all kinds has been destroyed. Even farm lands have been made un-
productive. In Holland, broken dikes have flooded 300,000 acres with salt
water, and it will take five years to restore the fertility. Vast Ukraine
areas have been gashed and torn. From 70 to 80 percent of the livestock
in some areas of Europe is gone, and city after city has been flattened.
3. Current Plan.
The Potsdam economic program for Germany, which was adopted
virtually intact from the American Joint Chiefs of Staff directive sent
to General Eisenhower on the eve of Germany's collapse, was accompanied
(1) United States Hews, Volume XIX, Number 39, October 26, 1945
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by a reparations plan, which was based on Russian proposals. Since the
two sections of the Potsdam Agreement providing for the industrial dis-
armament of Germany and the collection of reparations were drafted
separately, rather than as inter-dependent parts of a coherent whole,
it has not been easy for the Allies to emerge with a consistent and
workable economic policy for Germany. According to the terms of the
reparations settlement, Russia secured a blank check for reparations in
its own zone, w'here the Red Army has already dismantled large
quantities of industrial plants and equipment, (l) In addition, Russia
is entitled to twenty-five percent of whatever capital the United States,
Great Britain and other countries entitled to reparations removed from
the western zones. (2) The amount of reparations to be collected in the
western zones was not definitely set, but February, 1946, (3) was fixed
as the deadline for completion of the reparations bill, which was to
be computed by the Allied Control Council under policies formulated by the
Allied Commission on Reparations. Meanwhile, the commanders in the
western zones have made advance deliveries of reparations from their areas.
4. Russian Pressure.
Russia, having lost a large part of the factories and equip-
ment in its western areas as a result of German devastation, has been
exerting pressure on Britain and the United States since the Potsdam
Conference to draw up a reparations bill that will call for the
removal of a large number of western Germany's best industrial plants
(1) According to official British reports, the Russians had removed
approximately ninety percent of the machinery and raw materials from
Berlin' s factories by the time the British and Americans entered Berlin
early in July, 1945. London Times, August 9, 1945.
(2) Fifteen percent of these reparations to be conditional on deliveries
to the British and American zones of food, timber, coal, ptoash, and
other resources from the Russian, and ten percent to be delivered
without payment of any kind in return.
(3) The deadline is almost two months overdue at the time of this writing.
..
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and equipment. Early this fall, an extraordinary State Committe, appointed
to ascertain Russia’s war damages, declared that the Soviet Union had
suffered 679 billion rubles' worth of damages by the Nazis, and "Pravda"
promptly declared that this figure represented Russia’s minimum claim. (1)
Moscow has also requested that the machinery of some of the most valuable
plants in the British, French and American zones--such as the Opel motor
works, I. G. Farben, and the chemical and dye trust, be included in its
share of the reparations. (2)
5. Attitude of the Yfestern Powers.
Despite Russian pressure for more speedy collection of
reparations, the western powers have thus far made only token payments
from their zones, announcing that various large war-production plants
are being dismantled for delivery as reparations. In those cases in
which reparations can be collected in the form of plants for making
armaments, synthetic oil and rubber, and chemicals used for warfare,
there is no disagreement among the Allies as to the meaning of the
Potsdam provisions for removing industrial equipment from western
Germany. But serious disagreements have developed in connection with
industrial plants not restricted to military purposes, for the Allies
have not yet succeeded in reaching an understanding on the question of
what definite types and numbers of industries are needed for Germany’s
"Approved post-war peacetime needs".
(1) Embassy of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, "Information
Bulletin, " September 18, 1945, Page 1. Figures given by the
Committee are based on the U.S.S.R.’s state prices of 1941.
(2) New York Times, October 5, 1945.
..
.
,
.
.
-
.
.
.
- 134 -
E. Postwar Occupation Problems .
The State and War Departments have estimated the required period
of occupation of Germany as ten to twenty-five years in duration. It is
difficult to understand how a German economy can he reconstructed and
the country made self-supporting while four armies occupy four zones of
the country, which for all intents and purposes are separate entities
maintaining distinct frontiers. Two of the occupying forces have stripped
their zones of foodstuffs, industrial equipment, and live off the land.
1. Withdrawal Required for Recovery.
A nation stripped of her frontiers and industrial wealth
with over twenty million refugees expelled from ex-propriated lands
crowded within its reduced borders '.Till have great difficulty in recovering
economically under the bayonets of four occupying armies. Despite out-
side assistance from the United States and Great Britain plus agitation
of those pavers for a centralized control of Germany it is doubtful ii
either Russia or France will agree unless they are rewarded handsomely.
History has proved that an occupied country will never pro-
duce as well as a country ruled in theory at least by its own countrymen.
The Nazi occupied countries proved this adage correct, and the friction
between occupying forces and the civilian population is an important
morale factor. In Japan the plan of occupation sets forth the promise
that over a pre-determined period of time (estimated at five years) troops
will be gradually withdrawn and the reins of government turned over to
civilian officials whose democratic sympathies have been established.
2. Preventing Rearmament.
The rapid and unprecedented conversion of peacetime industry
to war production in the United States proved the difficulty of
differentiating between those industries classified as essential to a
-.
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peacetime economy and those necessary in time of war. In attempting
to devise a peacetime economy for Germany, the Allied Control Council
has "become increasingly aware of this difficulty. On February 2, 1946,
however, the Council abolished nine of Germany's key industries including
synthetic gasolene, rubber, ammonia, primary aluminum and magnesium, ball
and taper bearings, certain war chemicals, and even heavy farm tractors
and heavy machine tools. This order was qualified with a provision
making it ’’subject in cases to the necessity for providing exports
to pay for imports, and to availability in world markets", (l)
It would appear that as long as the Allied Control Commission
has the will to rigidly inspect and exercise supervisory control over
German industry no problem need arise. When the Allied nations become
lax and allow Germany to expand and rearm openly, as was the case in
the 1930's, the resulting catastrophe will be of their own making.
3. Disposition of the Ruhr.
The costly deadlock in the Allied Control Council, initiated
in November 1945, and still effective, has set the victorious powers
back a year in disposing of and rehabilitating Germany. France with
the backing of Russia has been the instigator of the deadlock despite
pressure and counter proposals of the United States to by-pass France
and secure approval of the Council by a majority vote rather than the
unanimous assent required at present. The bone of contention is the
vital Ruhr industries which France feels are a threat to her security
while under German control. The United States has contended that to
detach the Ruhr from Germany will prove such a handicap that the
restoration of Germany to Europe's economy would prove impossible.
(l) Boston Globe, February 3, 1946.
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Eritish official experts are studying a plan to establish a
four-power corporation to run Germany's Ruhr industries for a previously
arrived at duration. Directors appointed by the United States, Great
Britain, Russia, and France would administer the corporation which
would operate industries that could only be maintained for the benefit o f
the general European economy. (1)
F. A Strong Germany—Two Views .
1. Can’t Be Kept Down by Economic Force.
The people in America and Britain, who have been saying that
the Potsdam plan for Germany' s economic recovery would not work, now
have strong support in the report of the experts advising the Office of
Military Government. The experts, headed by the able Prof. Calvin
Hoover, included well-known practical industrialists.
In the main, this report makes the point that, with the loss
of her eastern territories, Germany will have to be more, rather than
less, of an industrial nation than before. In the face of this, the
position taken by Henry Morgenthau, Jr., becomes fairly fantastic.
The report reveals very sharply the divergence of views
between the Russians and the British with regard to the future of Germany.
The best example of this divergence is in the estimates of the steel
production to be allowed. The Russians proposed 3,000,000 tons annually.
The British proposed 11,000,000 tons. The United States, at first, held
the compromise figure of 7,000,000 tons, but has now revised that figure
upward to 10,000,000 tons. Since steel production is one important
measure of industrialisation, it is important to note that the British-
(1) Boston Globe, February 3, 1946
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American figure is approximately twice the German steel production in 1932.
The Potsdam plan was to allow Germans no higher living stand-
ards than that enjoyed by their European neighbors. The experts accept
this standard, but point out that in order to achieve it in, many industrial
lines, Germany must be allowed more, rather than less, production than
before the war. This is because exports are essential to secure the
food supply for what remains of Germany after the rich eastern provinces
have been removed.
There is also the necessity of producing enough to enable
Germany to make payments on foreign investments in Germany and on the
large debit clearing balances, which Germany had accumulated at the end
of the war.
Once more, the inexorable facts of economics break in upon
political and military judgments.
The truth of it all is that no plan by which a nation is to
be held down by economic sanctions will work. If Germany is to be kept
harmless, it must be by military and political, not economic force. (1)
2. We Did Not Fight War to Help Them.
If some Germans were to come forward with a demand that
Germany must be allowed to export 2,898,000,000 marks’ worth of goods a
year, the world would be inclined to answer with a short, crude laugh.
Yet, says, the New York Times, precisely this plan has been put forward—by
Americans; by American advisers attached to our Office of Military Govern-
ment
.
The plan rests on a mass of contradictions. It is gravely ex-
plained that Germany needs these exports mainly to pay the Allies for
(l) Moley, Raymond, Boston Globe, December 7, 1945.

- 138 -
the cost of occupation, at the rate of about $5 per soldier per day.
It is admitted that, so far as Germany’s domestic economy
is concerned, she will come out fairly even, with at most a trade deficit
of only 161,000,000 marks a year. That is an item of no importance, in
world trade terms; it comes to about §40,000,000 or less than 50 cents
per German per day, and the Allies are entitled to ask the Germans to
pull in their belts 50-cents-ayear ’ s worth, and do without.
But, our experts say, Germany needs an additional 2,737,000,000
marks a year to pay the Allies for the cost of occupation, and chiefly
for that reason, ought to be allowed to produce and sell vast quantities
of coal, machinery, chemicals and precision and optical instruments.
But the main purpose of occupation is to see to it that
German industry does not revive as a threat to world peace ’. To permit
German industry to revive in order to pay the costs of an occupation which
is designed to keep it from reviving is like financing a safety-first
campaign through the sale of firecrackers.
The suggestion that the German industries involved will
not be war industries, but merely innocent producers of machinery, chemicals
and precision goods ought to bring a giggle, at least, from every American
manufacturer of machinery, chemicals and precision goods who converted
for war work during recent years.
The Russians may be inclined to assume that the American
plan is directed against them, and expresses our desire to build up a
German bastion against the rise of Soviet power. Why must we make Germany
come out even? We did not fight this war to produce an orderly Germany
in a disorderly world. Why can’t we let the Germans, those captains of
.
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disorder, clean up their own mess, an educational device known to every
parent and every teacher? (l)
G. Unsolved Problems.
Almost one year after V-E Day, the Allies find themselves confronted
in occupied Germany by a number of unsolved problems which fall under
three main headings.
1. Inconsistencies in Planning.
In the first place, there are several inconsistencies among
the various Potsdam plans for Germany that have made it difficult to
carry out certain provisions of the settlement at any particular moment
without interfering with the execution of other prescribed terms. The
drastic territorial revisions in Germany's eastern frontiers have been
accompanied by measures for industrial disarmament and wholesale
reparations that are making it all the more difficult for Germany to
support its population. For example, the Germans in Czechoslovakia and
Hungry, as well as in the areas ceded to Poland and Russia, have been
unceremoniously evicted from their homes and deported to the Reich. At
the same time, however, the Allies maintain that they do not want these
measures to interfere with the maintenance in Germany of a subsistance
standard of living. This standard is obviously necessary, not merely
because of humanitarian considerations on the part of the Allies, who
are not willing to adopt the depopulation techniques employed by the
Nazis, but because of the political objectives set forth at Potsdam.
The Big Three have declared that they wish to aid in the eventual
establishment of democratic institutions in Germany—a goal which will
obviously be unattainable if the present economic situation in Germany
does not improve.
(1) Grafton, Samuel, Boston, Globe, December 7, 1945.
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2. Diverging Policies.
Policies in the Allied zones of occupation appear to be
diverging more and more, with the result that a united policy in Germany
—
on which so much depends not only in Germany, but also in the realm of
inter-Allied relations—is being seriously compromised. Although the
official Allied plan is to maintain Germany as a unit, under the
supervision of the Allied Control Council in Berlin, in practice
Germany is partitioned into the four segements outlined for purposes
of military occupation. Between these military zones, there are distinct
frontiers which are incompatible with the agreed policy of securing
uniformity of treatment of the civilian population throughout Germany.
Since it is French opposition to the Potsdam terms that constitutes the
most important immediate obstacle to the successful operation of the
central control machinery, efforts should be made to end the deadlock
created by the French representative in the Allied Control Council. The
other Allies should, first of all, seek the cooperation of France by
attempting to reach a compromise settlement on the questions of the
Rhineland and the Ruhr that will satisfy the French desire for security
against Germany. If this fails, the Allies might re-examine the provision
for unanimous decisions by the Allied Control Council in favor of a
majority rule. A divided Germany should be avoided at all costs, since
it would definitely encourage the further division of Europe and endanger
the alliance that won the war and is the only hope for establishing a
framework for keeping the peace.
3. Filling of Gaps Created by Destruction of Nazism.
The gravest shortcoming of Allied policy in Germany, as
revealed by the record of the first year of occupation, is that there
• ;
.
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is an absence of any concerted measures to fill the gap created by
the destruction of Nazism. The Russians obviously want a left-wing
government based on land-holding peasantry and well-disciplined trade
unions while the British and Americans, who tend to regard the Weimar
Republic as the norm for Germany—have carried out no land reforms and
given no definite encouragement to the reestablishment of unions. In
order to coordinate these divergent views on the type of post-war regime,
Germany should have, it is of the utter most importance that the Allies
maintain adequate and able control over the Reich during the conversion
period. If the corps of American civilian administrators scheduled to
relieve the military government group in June, 1946, is much better
qualified than its predecessors, the United States may still fulfill
its obligations in Germany. If it is unable to do so, however, Americans
will have little basis for objecting to the development of political
tendencies in the Reich of which they disapprove for the United States
will have lost its position in Germany by default, (l)
(l) Hadsel, Winifred N., ”Allied Military Rule in Germany”, Foreign
Policy Reports, Volume XXI, Number 16, November 1, 1945.
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APPENDIX I
TABLES
Total Receipts From German Taxes and Customs
Duties
(Reichsmarks)
1928-1929 9
,
023
,
000,000
1932-1933 6
,
647
,
000,000
1935-1936 9
,
654
,
000,000
1937
-
1938 13
,
964
,
000,000
1938
-
1939 17
,
000
,
000,000 *
* Estimate
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TABLES
Average Size of German Corporations *
Capital Stock in 1,000 RM
1928-29 1938-39 1939-40
Producers’ Goods 3,120 6,592 6,874
Consumers’ Goods 1,290 1,675 1,845
Luxuries 639 993 ?
Building Trades and Materials 1,062 1,375 1,565
Chemicals 3,791 7,579 8,380
Transportation (Private) 4,138 3,076 ?
Water, Gas & Electricity 7,302 12,532 13,446
Banks 2,932 5,405 6,326
Financial Holding Companies 8,409 12,070 ?
Insurance Companies 2,078 3,209 3,219
All Corporations 1,958 3,397 3,798
* Averages for various industries were computed by dividing capital
stock for a given industry by the number of corporations for that
industry. The average for all corporations was obtained by dividing
the total capital stock by the total number of corporations*
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TABLES
Transportation
1929 1932 1937
Rolling Stock
Motor Vehicles (1,000)
Motorcycles 608 866 1,327
Automobiles 432 549 1,108
Motor Omnibuses 11 12 17
Trucks and Lorries 144 174 322
Railroads (1,000)
Locomotives 26 24 24
Coaches 90 91 87
Freight Cars 660 639 587
River Boats
With Motor Power 4,872 4,841 5,440
Without Motor Power 14,557 12,944 12,441
Traffic Carried
Airplane
Passengers Carried (1,000) 97 99 323
Freight & Mail Carried (tons) 2,456 2,503 8,721
Railroads
Passengers (million) 2,057 1,352 1,874
Freight (Million tons) 531 307 547
River Traffic
140,669 73,744 133,080Freight (1,000 tons)
't
1890
1913
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TABLES
German Foreign Trade
Exports
Semi-Finished And Foodstuffs
Finished Products
Imports
Raw Materials
2.148.000.
000
7.536.000.
000
1.397.000.
000
3.049.000.
000
1.797.000.
000
5.003.000.
000

1835
1845
1855
1865
1875
1885
1895
1905
1915
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TABLES
German Railroads
(kilometers)
Mileage in Operation Increase Per Decade
6
2,300 2,300
8,290 5,990
14,690 6,400
27,930 13,240
37,650 9,720
46,560 8,910
56,980 10,420
62,410 5,430
..
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TABLES
German National Income
(Reichmarks)
1929 75,900,000,000
1932 45,200,000,000
1936 64,900,000,000
1937 71,000,000,000
1938 76,000,000,000
* Without Austria and Sudetenland. It is noteworthy that while
Germany only in 1938 regained the national income of 1929,
the national income in England in 1937 already exceeded that
of 1929 by almost 20 percent.
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TABLES
Germany
Number Gainfully Employed
1882 1907 1925 V 1933
(three ciphers omitted)
Agriculture & Forestry 7,135 8,557 9,763 9,343
Industry and Crafts 5,988 9,981 13,479 13,053
Commerce & Communications 1,420 3,441 5,185 5,939
Private & Public Service 984 1,712 2,188 2,699
Domestic Service 1,358 1,465 1,394 1,296
16,885 25,156 32,009 32,296
Percentage of Total
Agriculture & Forestry 42.3 34.0 30.5 28.9
Industry and Crafts 35.5 39.7 42.1 40.4
Commerce & Communications 8.4 13.7 16.2 18.4
Private & Public Service 5.8 6.8 6.8 8.4
Domestic Service 8.0 5.8 4.4 3.9
100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
1
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TABLES
German Foreign Trade
('.Yithout re-export; in marks)
1872
1880
1890
1900
1910
1913
Exports
2
.
492
.
000
.
000
2
.
977
.
000
.
000
3
.
410
.
000
.
000
4
.
753
.
000
.
000
7
.
475
.
000
.
000
10
,
097
,
000,000
Imports
3
.
465
.
000
.
000
2
.
844
.
000
.
000
4
.
273
.
000
.
000
6
.
043
.
000
.
000
8
.
934
.
000
.
000
10
,
770
,
000,000

155 -
APPENDIX II
THE GERMAN SETTLEMENT *
It is an irony of history that the terms for Germany decided
at Potsdam should have been published within forty-eight hours of the
dropping of the first atomic bomb. One may wonder what future historians
will make—in such a context— of the victorious statesmen’s conception
of security. 'If one bomb can annihilate Koenigsberg, do the Russians
gain much by annexing it? What possible defensive importance can be
attached to a frontier on the Oder— or anywhere else? Can the ban on
German production of aircraft and sea-going vessels have any bearing
on war-making power in the Atomic Age? Once again we are reminded of
the appalling gap between man 1 s adult scientific mind and his political
infantilism. It is as though the victors, in the age of the tank, were
making a peace of bows and arrows. It would, however, be grossly unfair
to blame the statesmen at Potsdam for failing to arrange a settlement in
keeping with scientific and strategic possibilities which the scientists
themselves are not yet able to predict. The charge against them is not
that they are making a bad peace in a new unpredictable scientific con-
text. It is that they are making a peace that would be bad in any
context.
It is not their aim to make a Carthaginian peace. The Potsdam
Declaration makes this clear. A German community is to survive
—
decentralised, perhaps, but still a recognisable national unit with,
eventually, a central government. Straight away, political parties
and trade union activity, the democratic freedoms, are to be restored,
* Terms imposed on Reich viewed by "The London Economist" as a Hitlerian
peace--Breakdown of Potsdam Conference controls and a renewal of
threat of Yfar expected in ten years.
.*
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and the Allies state that their aim is "to prepare for the eventual re-
construction of German political life on a democratic basis and for
eventual peaceful co-operation in international life by Germany."
The aim is unexceptionable; but how is it to be attained?
A peace of "no indemnities and no annexations" is clearly impossible;
after all that has happened, no risks of another German aggression can
be run. But if there are to be safeguards and prohibitions, they must
not completely contradict the final avowed purpose of reir.corporating
Germany in a peaceful Europe. Nor must they place too groat a strain,
physical or moral, upon the victors, for the worst peace of all is a
peace that is first imposed and then is not enforced. In practice, the
two problems merge. A political or economic control onerous and minute
enough to drive the Germans into violent revulsion is likely to be so
costly for the Allies to maintain in terms of manpower, and so difficult
for them to defend in terms of their own public opinion—at least in the
West—that they might be easily manoeuvred and cajoled out of enforcing
it. Ideally, the terms imposed on Germany ought, therefore, while
offering a genuine safeguard against future war, to be such that the
Allies are reasonably certain of enforcing them. They ought also, in
their degree of severity, to be such as not to render hopeless the
ultimate reconciliation of Germany.
Do the Potsdam terms fulfil these conditions? There can be
only one answer. They do not. The political conditions may propose a
return to democracy. The territorial and economic terms make it certain
that this political objective will not be achieved. It is now as good
as certain that in the East the German frontier will lie along the Oder
and the Yfestern Neisse. Russia takes Koenigsberg and a large part of
.<
.
-
.
,
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East Prussia. The rest of the territory is transferred to Poland to
"administer" until the Peace Conference, when the final decision on the
fate of these lands will be taken--a face-saving formula which does not
mask the fact of annexation. The French claim to the left bank of the
Rhine has been postponed, but will now be difficult to resist. Nothing
is said in the Potsdam Declaration of the Czechs’ claims. They too will
be pressed all the more vigorously now. At the same time, the principle
of mass expulsions of Germans from annexed territory or from neighbouring
states has been accepted. The Poles and the Czechs have been asked to
halt in their expulsions—but only so that the work can be done in a more
orderly manner. The final result of these sweeping changes of frontiers
and populations Tri.ll be to put between 50 and 60 million Germans to live
in a territory not much bigger than Great Britain.
To sustain even a moderate standard of living for such a
densely populated mass, the Germans would require a high degree of
industrialisation. But the economic plans of Potsdam seem to point in
the opposite direction. It is true that the terms permit to Germany
"average living standards not exceeding the average standards of living
of European countries (excluding the United Kingdom and the USSR)."
But this is evidently to be an upper, not a lower, limit; nor is it
made clear how this extremely vague level is to be reached. The Allies
say that they will put "primary emphasis .. .on the development of agri-
culture and peaceful domestic industries
.. .and control German industry
and all economic and financial international transactions .. .with the aim
of preventing Germany from developing a war potential."
The policy, be it noted, is not to prevent Germany from using
its war potential, but to prevent it from having one. Since, in modern
\>
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industry, it is almost impossible to distinguish between plant and
processes of wartime value from those of purely peacetime use, this
policy, literally interpreted, involves the large-scale deindustrialisation
of Germany.
This conclusion is borne out by the agreement reached on
reparations. Apart from Germany's external assets, reparations are now
to take one form only—the removal of industrial plant from Germany.
The Russians will provide for the Poles out of their zone of occupation.
In addition, they will receive 25 per cent of any industrial capital
removed from the western zones, although 15 per cent is to be conditional
on certain deliveries of food, coal, timber and potash from the Russian
zone, (it should be observed that this arrangement gives Russia a
vested interest in the severity of the Western Powers' exactions; any
moderation would be a blow at Russia.) The remaining 75 per cent of the
"escern deliveries will be shared out among the Western Allies. The
transfer is to be completed in two years. There will apparently be no
reparations in money or in kind after that date.
ihe Germans will be allowed to keep only such plant as is
necessary for their peacetime industry. The Reparations Commission is
to decide how much this represents; the rest will be transferred, subject
only to a final veto by the Military Governor in each zone.
Until the Reparations Commission has completed its survey, it
is impossible to be dogmatic about the final effects of the economic
settlement. Germany's present war industry is certainly overblown.
If munitions industries" are narrowly defined, a considerable transfer
of plant from these industries might still, in theory, leave the Germans
with sufficient industrial capacity to maintain a reasonable standard.
-,
'
'*>
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But in practice, when the bomb damage and the Reparations Commission
have done their work, there will be very little left. The economic
clauses and the reparations clauses, taken in conjunction, amount to
the policy associated \7ith the name of Mr. Morgenthau, that of the
deindustrialisation and pastoralisation of Germany.
If this is indeed the policy, then it must surely be obvious
that it will not work. The German community will not be reconciled to
it. An economic slum is not a suitable background for the growth of
democracy and the peaceful mind. A hostile, resentful and impoverished
nation, 50 million strong, even without arms, is a certain source of
trouble. The settlement will therefore need to be rigidly and minutely
enforced. The Allies apparently accept this fact. They appear to
envisage a close control over every aspect of German industry. TTot only
are all "arms, ammunition and implements of war... all types of aircraft
and sea-going ships 1 ' to be banned, but "production of metals, chemicals,
machinery and other items that are directly necessary to a war economy
shall be rigidly controlled and restricted to Germany's approved post-war
peacetime needs."
It is almost impossible to picture the army of inspectors,
accountants, bureaucrats and technicians which would be necessary to
achieve so searching a control. It would demand from the Allies precisely
the kind of technical skill which is so urgently needed for reconstruction
at home in all the Allied countries. It would place on the different
Allies for a decade or more the responsibility of exporting their
keenest officials to entirely unproductive work. The leaders at Potsdam
appear to have seen this difficulty of manpower. In the most curious of
all the curious sections in their Declaration they state that German
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administrative machinery is to be established "to proclaim and assume
administration of the economic controls established by the Control
Council." Can the Allies seriously mean that they intend to rely upon
Germans to supervise the impoverishment of Germany?
A system of economic control on the scale envisaged by the
Potsdam Declaration is probably impossible under any conditions. It is
certainly impossible as part of a treaty which public opinion in .the
Western world will find increasingly hard to defend. It might be possible
to grow reconciled to annexations and uprootings if, in the end, the
uprooted people were settling down to a reasonable standard of life.
It might be possible to accept very much lower living standards in
Germany if there were no unjust frontier settlements to add to public
uneasiness. But the joining of a bad territorial and a bad economic
settlement to a cumbrous and exacting system of Allied occupation and
control seems precisely designed to create in a few yesrs 1 time a
revulsion of feeling in the viest compared with which the revulsion against
Versailles will be as nothing. Given such a revulsion, what hope would
there be of maintaining the system of control which can alone perpetuate
the rigid prohibitions under which Germany is to live? Ana once the
process of relaxing the settlement had begun, it what fatal resurgence
of German power might it not end? The Potsdam Settlement will not last
ten years, and when it breaks down there will be nothing but the razor
edge balance of international anarchy between civilization and the
atomic bomb.
If the only possible alternative to the Potsdam Peace were
to leave Germany uncontrolled and with an undiminished power of 'waging
war, then naturally it would be necessary to try to attempt the
.
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impossible--the maintenance of a minute control over every aspect of
Germany's industrial life. But there are other possibilities, other
methods of achieving the necessary safeguards which would not violate
the two basic principles of a workable settlement—that in fifteen
year's time a sufficient number of Germans, however grudgingly, would
accept it and that, whether they do or not, the Allies would be as
resolute and united in enforcing it as they were on VE Day itself.
The essence of such an alternative would be to make the central control
as simple, straightforward and obvious as possible. The point has
frequently been argued in The Economist. Here it need only be briefly
repeated. The simplest control to run is a control on the end-products
of industry. Prohibit the Germans from producing any form of armaments,
from V 2s to small-arms ammunition. If in fifteen years’ time the Allies
are as resolute as ever in maintaining this prohibition, it will be
sufficient. If they are not resolute enought even to forbid armaments,
how can it be supposed that they will use force to prevent the rebuilding
of a factory or the reconstruction of a blast-furnace?
Concentration on the central issue--the enforcement of total
and long-term disarmament-
-does not, of course, preclude other terms.
Some frontier changes might be accepted by the Western Powers even in the
long run as reasonable and necessary. Some transfer of industrial
capacity from the inflated German war industries would be possible.
So, if it is really necessary, would the assignment to reparations of a
certain proportion of the products of German industry over a limited
number of years.
There is, of course, no prospect of Russian agreement to any
such course. But if we know it to be right, must Russian opposition
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condemn us to silent acquiescence in a course we know to be ruinous?
Better by far to have the matter out now than to enter on a miserable
course of endless quarrels over the enforcement of the unenforceable
and the justification of the unjust. The Russians 1 determination to
loot Germany may not be unconnected with their failure to obtain
reconstruction credits in the Western countries. Every possible means
should be tried of getting them to change their attitude. But if they
will not, then the pursuit of truth and justice is a surer guide than
any calculations of future alliances. We may not be able to alter what
happens in the Russian zone, but we can at least disclaim responsibility
for it. And we can follow our own convictions in the West, where what
is left of Germany can be given the prospect, in the fullness of time,
of achieving liberty, equality and prosperity within a Western Europe
that is conscious of its political and economic unity. There is no
other cure for the German sore on the body of Europe than to heal it.
The healing may be a long and difficult process, but let us not rub salt
in the ’wound. Let us not now abandon the only hope of some time
escaping from an endless prospect of German wars.
The conviction that the peace proposed at Potsdam is a thoroughly
bad peace is not based on any sentimental softening towards Germany. It
is based on the belief that the system proposed is in the fullest sense
unworkable. It offers no hope of ultimate German reconciliation. It
offers little hope of the Allies maintaining its cumbrous controls
beyond the first years of peace. Its methods of reparations reinforce
autarky in Russia and consummate the ruin not only of Germany, but of
Europe. Above all, it has in it not a single constructive idea, not a
-.
.
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single hopeful perspective for the post-war world. At the end of a
mighty war fought to defeat Hitlerism, the Allies are making a
Hitlerian peace. This is the real measure of their failure.
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